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ABSTRACT 
 
The JSE Equity Market has evolved significantly since floor trading ended in 1996. Fast and 
efficient trading technology is attractive to market participants based not only locally but 
internationally as well.  How quick and cost effectively a trader can enter and exit a market 
plays a significant role in defining a market place’s liquidity. 
Liquidity is multidimensional, making it not only difficult to isolate a particular dimension 
but also challenging to fully measure, according to Liu (2006). Growth in trading activity 
following each trading engine upgrade in the JSE Equity Market has been quite evident. The 
microstructure changes, such as low latency trading that came about because of the 
technological enhancement and the plethora of academic research concerning high speed 
trading and liquidity, begged the question as to whether there was a trend regarding the 
exchange’s liquidity. It also questioned whether all liquidity was the same and whether it 
truly was as multidimensional as some authors have suggested. 
The purpose of this study was, using different liquidity measurements and methodologies, to 
determine whether liquidity improved or diminished during an eight-year period from 2 July 
2005 to 1 July 2013. An ANOVA analysis was done using each liquidity measurement’s 
results to determine differentiation between each July-to-July year and ascertain whether the 
liquidity was affected particularly after the implementation of the JSE’s latest trading engine 
upgrade. The study also aimed to determine whether these liquidity measurements liquidity 
rankings were in any way connected to each other using correlation. Thirdly, a portfolio event 
study was conducted to gauge whether the impact on liquidity due to the JSE’s 2012 trading 
engine upgrade, was statistically significant. Lastly, the aforementioned liquidity 
measurements which had shown changes in liquidity that were statistically significant were 
compared to the activity of low latency trading strategies on the JSE.  Overall, the results 
were varied and not fully conclusive to show a positive relationship between the trading 
engine upgrade, low latency trading and liquidity.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The JSE Equity Market has evolved significantly since floor trading ended in 1996 with 
technological trading system enhancements that have arguably been one of the key forces in 
transforming the exchange into the premier exchange in Africa. Today, the JSE is the 19
th
 
largest exchange in the world, based on market capitalisation according to the World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE 2013). Fast and efficient trading technology is attractive to 
market participants based not only locally but internationally as well. How quick and cost 
effectively a trader can enter and exit a market, plays a significant role in defining a market 
place’s liquidity. 
Liquidity is multidimensional, making it not only difficult to isolate a particular dimension 
but also challenging to fully measure, according to Liu (2006). 
There are numerous elements which contribute towards a market’s liquidity and its 
efficiency.  The challenge for many exchanges is to provide a market place that offers market 
participants the ability to execute large quantities of stock at a low enough cost that can result 
in minimal price impact. Quick, easy and cost effective access and exit of a market remains 
the quintessential goal for the majority of market participants.  Apart from trading costs, 
frictions such as demand pressure, inventory risk and the access to private information all 
contribute towards the illiquidity of a market place.  The JSE Equity Market liquidity is no 
exception as all these aforementioned frictions impact the exchange’s marketability as a 
preferred market place.  
Trading that happens in microseconds as opposed to milliseconds has redefined automated 
trading and ultimately low latency trading, worldwide. The JSE recognised the need to 
remain attractive to this sector of the market especially considering that up to 56% of equity 
trades in the US and 38% of equity trades in Europe are of a high frequency trading (HFT) 
nature (Tabb, 2010). Hence the need to introduce trading solution technology to the market 
place that was relevant to the global exchange world and that would foster speedy executions. 
The new trading platform Millennium Exchange
TM
, developed by technology solutions 
provider MillenniumIT, was implemented on 2 July 2012. The new technology has allowed 
market participants to execute in the JSE Equity Market central order book at speeds almost 
400 times faster than the previous trading engine, JSE TradElect, originally housed in 
London as of 2007 (Corporate Communications Consultants, 2011). The vision behind the 
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implementation of the more advanced technology would not only bring a low latency 
advantage to market participants and attract HFT activity (thereby encouraging trading 
volumes), but the relocation of the trading solution from London to Johannesburg would 
further enhance operational stability (Corporate Communications Consultants, 2011).  The 
significant reliance that the JSE and market participants once placed on the UK-SA 
connectivity links when the trading engine was housed abroad was therefore no longer 
pertinent. 
In order to remain relevant within the international capital market space, exchanges must 
offer sufficient liquidity. Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) support this as they mention that an 
exchange’s primary role is to provide liquidity. It can therefore be argued that because of 
regulatory progressions and technological advancements such as the development of highly 
complex trading technology, the emergence of multiple trading venues seen internationally 
and the subsequent introduction of algorithmic trading (AT) and HFT, the importance of 
offering liquidity has grown exponentially. Montalvo (2003) states that an exchange’s 
success is ultimately associated with the level of liquidity it employs.  
Having said that, it is necessary to truly understand why liquidity is important in the capital 
market space. Muranaga (1999) highlights this by stating that market liquidity significantly 
impacts price discovery in the market and is therefore thought to have a close relationship 
with market efficiency and stability as well. Sarr and Lybek (2002) agree with this notion by 
stating that certain markets are attractive because of improved allocation and information 
efficiency. Central to these benefits is liquidity and whether large quantities can be sold 
without impacting its market price. Sarr and Lybek (2002) continue that liquid assets are 
categorised by small transaction costs, easy trading, timely settlement and by having minimal 
effect on market prices. These are all attractive attributes to market players around the world 
who are no longer restricted because of geographical challenges, have the freedom to search 
for trading venues that are accessible and that offer the best possible profit opportunities.   
When examining annualised JSE Equity Market liquidity levels in Table 1 that follows, it is 
evident that liquidity figures are relatively low when compared to international exchange 
houses such as the London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Boerse and Shanghai Stock Exchange 
which have liquidity levels between 70% and 155% (WFE 2013). 
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Table 1:  Annualised JSE Equity Market Liquidity (2005 - 2012)  
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
43% 50% 48% 52% 83% 58% 48% 40% 
Source: JSE (2013) 
 
What is of interest is that although JSE Equity Market liquidity appears to have decreased 
over the last number of years, the general trading activity on the exchange has grown 
significantly. One could argue that the JSE’s Equity Market liquidity levels have fluctuated 
over the past several years due to factors which include global sentiment, technological 
advancements, changes in market microstructure, the demand for South African securities 
and due to developments in both local and international regulatory frameworks. However, it 
could also be argued that different liquidity measurements could show different results. 
Many of the characteristics of market liquidity can be dealt with using traditional liquidity 
measures, such as bid-ask spreads, turnover ratios and selected price-based indicators.  Sarr 
and Lybek (2002), however, highlight that these indicators are not conclusive and possess the 
danger of sending mixed signals particularly during times of uncertainty and crisis. The 
authors suggest that these indicators cannot be viewed in isolation and should be seen in 
context with numerous market specific factors which affect asset and market liquidity. 
The purpose of this study was, using different liquidity measurements and methodologies, to 
determine whether liquidity improved or diminished during an eight-year period from 2 July 
2005 to 1 July 2013. An ANOVA analysis was done using each liquidity measurement’s 
results to determine differentiation between each July-to-July year and ascertain whether the 
liquidity was affected particularly after the implementation of the JSE’s latest trading engine 
upgrade. The study also aimed to determine whether these liquidity measurements liquidity 
rankings were in any way connected to each other using correlation. Thirdly, a portfolio event 
study was conducted to gauge whether the impact on liquidity due to the JSE’s 2012 trading 
engine upgrade, was statistically significant. Lastly, the aforementioned liquidity 
measurements which had shown changes in liquidity that were statistically significant were 
compared to the activity of low latency trading strategies on the JSE  
The study is structured as follows. Following this opening section, Chapter 2 offers a detailed 
overview of the literature that forms the contextual framework of this study. Chapters 3 and 4 
unpack the complexity of market liquidity in terms of the factors that typically affect it and 
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the strengths and weaknesses of certain liquidity measures. Next, Chapter 5 looks at how 
technological advancements and the market microstructure changes that resulted because of 
these advancements have impacted liquidity.  Chapter 6 explains the data and methodologies 
applied. Penultimately, Chapter 7 offers insights into the analysis and results of the data 
presented in this research.  Lastly, Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In trying to define liquidity, an article by Liu (2006, p.1) mentions that “liquidity is generally 
described as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost with little price impact”. 
The author also states that existing liquidity measurements only really examine a single 
dimension of liquidity, when liquidity is actually multidimensional. Therefore Liu (2006) 
believes that existing measures only really reveal a partial ability to encapsulate liquidity risk 
and could possibly be imprecise even in the dimension the measurement strives to isolate.   
In support of Liu’s (2006) statement that liquidity is multidimensional, a key study by authors 
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) emphasises that liquidity is a complex concept and 
that a number of illiquidity sources exist. These sources or frictions that lead to illiquidity, 
according to the authors, include exogenous transaction costs, demand pressure and inventory 
risk, private information and locating a counterparty with specific criteria in mind, such as a 
particular security or a particular quantity of that security. This study emphasises the 
numerous factors that affect liquidity, which is vital in cementing an understanding of the 
intricacies of liquidity.  Another article by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyan (2002) considers 
the numerous explanatory variables used to influence liquidity as their study examines the 
aggregated market spreads, depths, volume and number of daily transactions for US stocks.  
Although it is difficult to compare the South African context to the US market, the study 
offers valuable command of the subject matter that is liquidity. 
An interesting view from Wuyts (2007) analyses the economic forces that determine and 
foster liquidity within stock markets and the many dimensions of liquidity. The author also 
examines whether liquidity is a desirable feature seeing as there are two schools of thought: a 
“dark” view and a “bright” view (Wuyts 2007, p. 281).  The dark view refers to the hazards 
of liquidity where liquid markets are now generally focused on the short term and on 
investors who are no longer concerned with fundamentals when choosing companies and 
formulating their investment decisions (Wuyts, 2007). The author states that uncertainty is 
the end result which ultimately impacts financial systems holistically. The bright view 
believes that investors are more likely to engage in the market when liquidity is at its 
optimum (Wuyts 2007).  The result is that in increasing the number of participants in the 
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market, the price impact of trades is restricted and ultimately fosters a stable market (Wuyts, 
2007).  
A very significant supposition is that of Sarr and Lybek (2002) who suggest that liquidity 
measurements cannot be viewed on their own and should instead be seen in context with 
numerous market specific factors. The authors offer an overview of indicators that can indeed 
be utilised to demonstrate and analyse liquidity developments in financial markets. In 
particular, the authors focus on the different aspects of market liquidity which are applied in 
certain foreign exchange, money and capital markets so as to indicate their effective 
practicality. 
Amihud (2002, p.1) adds that although “finer measures of illiquidity”, such as the bid-ask 
spreads mentioned in Chapter 1, are possible to calculate, the liquidity measures themselves 
make it impossible to measure the long-term series of illiquidity that is required to test the 
effects over time of liquidity. Instead, the author’s illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ), which is the daily 
ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar (in this case, Rand) volume, averaged over a year, is 
indeed able to do so. This measurement plays a particularly central role in the data analysis to 
follow in Chapter 6. 
However, a contrasting article by Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) suggests an 
alternative measure to the widely used ILLIQ measurement. These authors believe that there 
is little evidence or agreement on which liquidity measures are more effective and whether 
these measurements consider the transaction costs of market participants.   
Following the unpacking of liquidity and understanding some of the many factors that impact 
it, Grossman and Miller (1988) present a basic model representing market structure that 
encapsulates the essence of market liquidity. In addition, Handa and Schwarts (1996) offer a 
brief introduction to the different market structures and the effect on liquidity provision. 
Technological improvements to an exchange’s infrastructure are key in facilitating a liquid 
and efficient market. When discussing the impact of technology and market structure on 
liquidity, an article by Jain (2003) offers insights into the trading mechanism and structural 
features of 51 stock exchanges and the effect of these characteristics on closing bid-ask 
spreads, volatility and trading turnover.  
A relevant study by Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) examines the value of an 
improvement in the market structure of certain stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The 
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authors explore the value discovery, trading efficiency and stock liquidity following the 
transition from a once-a-day call auction to repeated continuous trading after an opening 
daily call auction session.  Although this research is not focused on a technological upgrade 
per se, but rather a market structure change, it still offers insight into how improving the 
quality of a trading mechanism can improve market liquidity and the implications of a market 
structure change.   
Although technology is a key driver in the evolution of trading and liquidity, regulatory 
changes have proven to be the catalyst in shaping trading strategies. In particular, the 
introduction of the Regulation National Market System (RegNMS) allowed for increased 
competition within the US equity market because multiple trading venues started to appear 
(Deutsche Bank Research, 2011). As a result, technological enhancements lead to the birth of 
HFT, a microstructure change, as traders sought to gain rapid access to multiple trading 
platforms to exploit arbitrage opportunities (Deutsche Bank Research, 2011). Menkveld 
(2011) therefore focuses on fragmentation which resulted in the arrival of HFT – essentially a 
multi-venue market maker due to the fact that its operation uses capital to produce liquidity.  
Although HFT is not explicitly focused on in this study, the aforementioned studies are 
necessary in order to formulate a foundation to understand low latency trading and its effects 
on liquidity. 
Brogaard (2010) differentiates between AT and HFT and finds that although similar, HFT is 
defined by traders holding positions for very short periods of time with the intention to end 
the day neutral, whereas AT involves the traders holding their positions for much longer 
periods. With that being said, Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) examine whether the 
increased AT improves market liquidity and whether it should be encouraged. In their 
research, the authors found that the spreads of large NYSE stocks narrowed and both adverse 
selection and trade-related price discovery reduced due to AT. In support of this, Hendershott 
and Riordan (2012) add that AT demands liquidity when bid-ask spreads are narrow and 
provides liquidity when spreads are wide. 
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3 STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY 
 
Providing a market that offers timely, cost effective and efficient execution services is vital, 
more so now than ever before.  In a world where multiple trading venues exist, where latency 
arbitrage is the overriding investment strategy and where “the race to zero”1 is more 
heightened than before, exchanges cannot afford to be left behind. As Montalvo (2003) states, 
an exchange’s success is ultimately associated with the level of liquidity it employs. 
The JSE Equity Market consists of a number of trading segments which classify or segment 
securities based on varying degrees of liquidity and with that, also harbour varying degrees of 
liquidity risk: 
a) ZA01: Top 40 companies and the most liquid shares traded on the JSE Equity Market; 
b) ZA02: Medium liquid companies; 
c) ZA03: Less liquid companies which include AltX companies. 
These three segments consist of predominantly ordinary shares. 
There are multiple reasons as to why certain shares are more liquid than others. Liu (2006) 
believes that in fact it is firms themselves who could cause illiquidity. Should a firm hold a 
high probability of default or show poor management style, investors would shy away from 
their distressed stocks and they would naturally become less liquid (Liu, 2006). 
It would be imprudent to think that the number of factors that affect liquidity could be short 
listed and that they operate in isolation. Instead, these factors are often all deeply intertwined 
and interconnected with each other. Factors such as the large market capitalisation of 
companies, whether they are dual listed on other international exchanges (which allow for 
arbitrage) and their availability of free float stock for secondary trading, have arguably made 
the Top 40 stocks the most liquid on the JSE Equity Market. ZA02 and ZA03 consist of 
medium and small sized market capitalisation companies, respectively, such as AltX 
companies, where their available free float stock for secondary trading is generally low.   
From a regulatory perspective, the JSE’s Listing Requirements stipulate the required level of 
free float stock for the Main Board and AltX companies. AltX firms have lower free float 
                                                     
1
 Refers to the notion of zero latency and the challenge that technology providers face in achieving little to no 
latency within their systems.  
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stock requirements than Main Board companies. Typically, a large proportion of AltX firms’ 
stock is held by these companies’ directors, business founders and staff, leaving low levels of 
freely tradable stock for the market. This is a complex cycle – market participants do not 
trade these stocks as they are not particularly liquid and these stocks are not liquid because 
they are not particularly traded. 
There are however two particular opinions or sides to liquidity.  A significant consideration is 
that of Wuyts (2007) who refers to the dark side of liquidity with reference to the dangers of 
liquidity as he cites Keynes (1935) who viewed liquidity as a cause of undermining or 
unhinging markets, a notion that appears seemingly counterintuitive. The reasoning behind 
this is that liquid markets are generally focused largely on the short term and investors have 
moved away from fundamentals when choosing companies and formulating their investment 
decisions (Wuyts, 2007). Contrary to this, the bright view emphasises the significance and the 
advantages of liquidity for a spectrum of market participants (Wuyts, 2007). According to the 
author, investors are more likely to engage in the market when liquidity is at its optimum. 
Thus, increasing the number of participants in the market restricts the price impact of trades 
and ultimately fosters a stable market (Wuyts, 2007). 
There are a number of beneficial effects of increased liquidity for various market participants 
who support the bright view (Wuyts, 2007), such as that: 
a) traders reap the reward from increased liquidity as it facilitates purchases and sales of 
securities at lower costs which ultimately impacts their portfolio strategy; 
b) the author cites Pastor and Stambough (2003) who state that liquidity is perceived to 
be a risk factor priced into the market and therefore liquidity can be seen as risk-
reducing as investors would be more open to holding assets that offer greater 
liquidity; 
c) that liquidity remains vital for stock exchanges’ competitiveness and as an attractive 
investment platform; 
d) liquidity influences decisions of firms regarding the cost of capital, as liquidity is 
viewed as determinant of asset returns. 
Liu (2006) states that liquidity only truly becomes an important factor when the economy is 
expected to find itself in a recessionary state. In essence, this means that in such situations 
investors would naturally gravitate towards assets that are considered less risky and which 
can be easily and quickly bought or sold.   
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Although the benefits of liquidity are paramount, this does not rule out the possibility of 
global financial instability (Wuyts, 2007). Wuyts (2007, p.286) refers to the “commonality in 
liquidity”, when different assets’ liquidity move or shift together, as previously outlined by 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001).  Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) also refer to the same 
belief. Contrary to this belief is O’Hara (2004) who states that overall, this movement in 
liquidity would not result in financial instability. O’Hara (2004, p.6) has two arguments for 
this. Firstly, that when investors leave one asset, they tend to stay in the market and opt for 
other asset types, thus localising “flight to quality” and not creating global exposure. 
Secondly, such commonality might just trigger investors to enter the market and thus because 
of the influx of participants, stability is ultimately improved and sustained. 
Although liquidity is important, Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) cite Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) who argue that there must be a certain degree of illiquidity in the market as 
well. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) support this notion by adding that an 
equilibrium level of illiquidity means that the market must be sufficiently liquid to 
compensate liquidity providers (suppliers) but not so illiquid that it becomes attractive to new 
liquidity suppliers to enter the market. 
On the far end of the spectrum, too much illiquidity is not conducive to a functioning market 
either.  Sarr and Lybek (2002) believe that illiquid markets reflect a symptom as opposed to a 
cause of inadequate market functioning. The authors argue that the only sustainable way to 
develop liquid financial markets is to ensure sound and transparent economic policies which 
are supported by suitable trading, clearing and settlement systems and prudent central bank 
intervention to manage systemic risk. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) suggest that 
illiquidity is the result of exogenous trading costs, private information, inventory risk and 
search challenges. These factors and others are discussed in section 3.1 to follow.  
Overall, the greater the number of frictions that inhibit easy and speedy executions within the 
market, the less efficient the market appears.  Therefore an inefficient market is an illiquid 
market. 
3.1 Factors that Affect Stock Market Liquidity 
Wuyts (2007) examines the numerous factors that affect stock market liquidity and the 
implications of these determinants. The author notes that a vital part in examining the 
performance of certain trading systems is its liquidity as liquidity determines traders’ and 
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other market agents’ cost of buying or selling securities within the market. Apart from this, 
the author states that liquidity is also fundamental to exchanges to attract order flow from 
existing and potential traders. Wuyts (2007) adds that liquid markets entice order flow and 
liquidity and therefore also serve as a reason for firms to list themselves on the exchange as it 
is a factor in determining the firm’s cost of capital. 
The number of factors that affect liquidity is clearly significant, therefore only a few factors 
that are predominantly linked to trading, exchange and market structure, will be discussed in 
section 3.1.1 and onwards.  
3.1.1 Transaction Costs 
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) state that exogenous transaction costs such as 
brokerage fees, order processing costs and taxes impact the liquidity of a security. The more 
attractive the costs associated with transacting in a market, the easier investors will find it to 
recoup their return and the more willing investors would be to churn their stock (Amihud, 
Mendelson and Pedersen, 2005). 
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) cite Amihud and Mendelson (1986) whose views 
are that a risk neutral investor, when buying a security and expecting to pay transaction costs 
when settling the trade, would take these trading costs and future transaction costs into 
account when valuing the security. This ultimately affects purchase and sale of the security, 
that is, its liquidity. 
Transaction costs within the JSE Equity Market have always been a contentious point for 
market participants, for exactly the reasons mentioned by Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen 
(2005) above. Understanding the importance of fostering a liquid and sustainable market, JSE 
Equity Market reviewed its trading fee methodology. As of 30 September 2013, all 
transactions are to be charged a trading fee based on value at 0.0053% with a cap of R300 
(JSE Equity Market Price List v.02, 2013).  This revision has meant that market participants 
have greater predictability and certainty around fees that they will be charged which is a 
contributing factor to liquidity. It would be telling to determine the effects of this change in 
billing methodology on liquidity and although this falls outside the scope of this particular 
study, it is a rich source of information for follow-up studies. 
The impact of transaction costs extends to clientele effects (with respect to an investor’s 
preferred stock holding period) and liquidity as well. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen 
12 
 
(2005) believe investors’ desires to trade in any period or in their expected holding period is 
purely subjective. The authors argue that investors will only truly be moved to liquidate their 
stock when faced with the likelihood of a large enough liquidity shock or when the 
probability of the introduction of a lucrative investment opportunity is significant enough to 
force the investor to close out their current position in favour of the more lucrative option. It 
is therefore necessary for each market participant to understand its costs and required return.  
With this said, each investor views the impact of transaction costs on their required return 
differently. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) believe that a long-term investor who 
would be able to depreciate transaction costs over an extended expected holding period 
would require a lower required return versus a short-term investor who would require the 
opposite.  The authors suggest that in equilibrium, liquid assets are held by short-term 
(frequently trading) investors whereas the illiquid stock is held by long-term investors. 
3.1.2 Private Information  
The cost of a transaction includes more than the explicit fee. Amihud, Mendelson and 
Pedersen (2005) believe that a transaction could still be costly if market participants have 
private information regarding the fundamentals of a particular stock or private information 
about order flow. The authors indicate that when participants have access to private 
information, a buyer of a security might be apprehensive that a potential seller has access to 
privileged information (for example the company operating at a loss), whilst the seller might 
be uneasy that the buyer has privileged information that the company is about to flourish.  
Therefore, the authors are of the view that trading with an informed market participant means 
that a loss will be incurred.  
Regarding private information about order flow, Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) 
state that if a trading desk is informed that a hedge fund needs to rid itself of a large position 
and that this liquidation will lower share prices, the trading desk could sell early at still high 
prices and repurchase the stock at lower prices. Similarly, Liu (2006) positions asymmetric 
information to influence liquidity and create illiquidity. A situation could occur where, should 
investors be privy to private information, uniformed investors could learn of this advantage 
and opt to not trade and consequently inhibit liquidity (Liu, 2006).  
Informational efficiency is examined by the Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001), who 
found that improved liquidity stimulates a higher level of informational efficiency as 
increased trading takes place using private information after a reduction in the tick size of a 
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stock. However, Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) refer to Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) who argue to dismiss informationally efficient markets. These authors believe that 
market prices cannot completely reflect all relevant and available information because if this 
was the case, no market participant would have the enticement to use resources to collect 
information from the start. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) reason that market 
participants who collect information must be compensated through investment performance 
that is significant. The authors also state that having differences in information across market 
participants is an equilibrium occurrence and therefore another source of illiquidity. 
Bernstein (1987) believes that in order for a market to maintain the characteristics of a liquid 
market it depends on what motivates or incentivises buyers and sellers to enter the market 
right from the start. The author refers to two types of traders which ultimately help to shape 
the market into what it is. The first type is the noise trader who makes trades based on 
imperfect information and who will often force security prices away from its equilibrium 
price (Bernstein, 1987). Because of this shift, the result is undervaluation or overvaluation 
which appeals to information traders (the second type) who will push prices back to 
equilibrium levels (Bernstein, 1987). The authors therefore reveal that noise traders are a 
necessary part in maintaining a liquid market as they are vital for information traders to have 
someone to transact with them and that ultimately it is the noise trader who brings the depth, 
breadth and resiliency – and therefore liquidity. Bernstein (1987) concludes that the 
aforementioned characteristics encourage information traders to trade and that efficient prices 
can only occur if noise traders formulate inefficiencies through their constant purchases and 
sales.  
3.1.3 Order Flows 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) argue a slightly different position for liquidity. 
These authors ask whether liquidity is related to higher levels of arbitrageur activity and 
therefore a weakened connection between the prediction of future returns and past order 
flows – or rather an improved level of intraday market efficiency. The authors examine the 
predictability for NYSE stocks that traded on a daily basis over the period of 1993 to 2002.  
According to Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001), short-horizon predictability of 
returns from past order flows had a negative relationship with efficiency and therefore also 
affected liquidity. As bid-ask spreads became narrower; it was evident that mid-quote return 
predictability decreased which suggests that outsiders were more active in taking on order 
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flows during more liquid states of the market (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2001). The 
authors argue that short-horizon return predictability should be reduced by arbitrage trading, 
which, as is discussed in Chapter 5 dealing with HFT, should be more effective when the 
market is highly liquid. 
The empirical results of the study show that intraday market efficiency is highly correlated to 
daily liquidity in that the forecast ability of stock returns from lagged order flows is 
meaningfully reduced on days when the market experiences heightened liquidity levels 
(Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2001). Additionally, the authors’ results indicate that 
efficiency is enhanced when the minimum tick size is further reduced which naturally means 
a reduction in spreads. When examining the time-of-day in terms of liquidity, it was found 
that during the mid-afternoon, liquidity was viewed at its optimum as order flow was less 
predictive of ensuing returns (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2001). 
Overall, the authors find that liquidity plays an important role in creating efficiency as the 
return predictability from order flows is significantly reduced during periods of heightened 
liquidity levels. 
3.1.4 Demand Pressure and Inventory Risk 
According to Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) demand pressure occurs because not 
all market participants are constantly present in the market and as a result if a market 
participant needs to liquidate their position, a buyer is not always instantly present. What 
transpires is that the seller may sell to a designated market maker who purchases stock in 
expectation of exiting their position at a later stage (Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen, 
2005). The authors conclude that because the market maker has taken on the risk of prices 
fluctuating constantly, the market maker needs to be compensated for this risk through 
ultimately imposing a cost on the seller, by setting a larger bid-ask spread which again 
ultimately affects liquidity. 
3.1.5  Transparency 
Transparency is seen as the ability of market participants to view information such as 
knowledge on prices before and after the trading process (Wuyts, 2007). The author states 
that transparency can have two extremes: one where more transparency is linked with more 
informative prices and the other extreme where transparency can diminish liquidity as traders 
might be reluctant to disclose their trading strategy.  However, Wuyts (2007) adds that the 
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effect of transparency is different for certain market participants, such as informed traders 
who prefer less transparency whereas liquidity traders (market makers) opt for more 
transparency or disclosure. Pagano and Roell (1996) also find that when more pre-trade 
transparency exists with bids, offers and depths, more liquidity is prevalent. 
Wuyts (2007) also cites Rindi (2004) who establishes that, given a certain number of 
informed traders, liquidity would increase if markets’ transparency improved. Wuyts (2007) 
adds, however, that if information becomes endogenous, for example if market participants 
pay for information to become better informed, the result is the opposite. The author explains 
that uninformed market participants might be unwilling to supply liquidity for large orders, as 
the origin of these orders might be information driven. The author continues by stating that 
informed traders do not have this issue and that when pre-trade transparency is heightened, 
market participants have less drive to become informed. In such a situation, Wuyts (2007) 
states that the number of informed traders diminish and this includes the liquidity that they 
provide. 
3.1.6 Anonymity 
Anonymity is linked to transparency in that informed traders would opt for anonymous 
trading whilst liquidity traders would not (Wuyts, 2007). The author references Benviste, 
Marcus and Wihelm (1992) who says that demand and supply anonymity differ. These 
authors argue that the reason for this is that concealing information about the identity of 
liquidity demanders widens the bid-ask spread (reducing liquidity) as suppliers of liquidity 
can discern between informed and uniformed traders. 
3.1.7 Tick Size 
Wuyts (2007) cites a number of empirical papers, namely Bacidore (1997), Ahn, Cao and 
Choe (1998), Griffiths et al. (1998), Goldstein and Kavjecz (2000) and Choridia and Ball 
(2001) that have researched the effect of tick sizes on market quality. Wuyts (2007) states 
that, generally speaking, these studies found that after a reduction in the tick size, the spread 
narrowed notably but the depth of the bid-ask decreased. Significant too is that as one 
dimension of liquidity improves, in this case the spread, another dimension (depth) actually 
weakens (Wuyts, 2007). 
Theoretical models by Seppi (1997) and Parlour and Seppi (2001), cited by Jain (2003), 
indicate that tick sizes can change the dynamics of spreads that investors, within different 
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institutional settings, face. Again Jain (2003) cites authors Bacidore (1997) and Chakravarty, 
Harris and Wood (2001) who considered the bid-ask spreads and tick sizes on the Toronto 
Exchange and NYSE and found that these spreads became significantly narrower as stocks’ 
tick sizes became smaller. 
3.1.8  Consolidation and Fragmentation of Markets 
The Jain (2003) looks at consolidation and fragmentation of markets. The US market is 
particularly fragmented, through competition, which has a significant impact on liquidity.  
Jain (2003) cites Biais (1993) who believes that the mean spreads whether within a 
fragmented or consolidated market, are equal but more volatile in the latter. The 
consequences of fragmentation, from a microstructure perspective, are discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
3.1.9  Floor vs. Screen-Based Trading Systems 
Jain (2003) states that gone are the halcyon days where exchanges would rely on dealer 
quotes or open-outcry trading. Instead, most if not all exchanges around the globe offer pure 
electronic limit order book trading now. Some exchanges such as NYSE Euronext (US) 
operate a “hybrid” trading system which comprises of electronic public order books but also 
open-outcry floor trading (Jain, 2003, p. 2).  
The JSE’s open outcry floor trading has not been in existence since 1996 and since then, all 
trading is electronic or on screen. A few exchanges still operate floor trading, although in 
conjunction with screen-based trading such as the NYSE Euronext (Wuyts, 2007). Biais, 
Foucault and Salanie (1998) suggest that floor trading (and in dealer markets) show wide 
spreads and inefficient risk sharing but that this is not the case in screen-based limit order 
markets. Interestingly, a study by Theissen (2002) who compares the floor and screen-based 
trading system of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange which at the time operated both of these 
platforms in parallel, finds that the screen-based trading system supplies narrower spreads for 
liquid stocks but that floor trading is more competitive for less liquid stocks. 
Jain (2005) suggests that electronic trading has highly beneficial effects in the long run and 
that the equity premium has lowered meaningfully since moving from floor trading to 
electronic trading. Costs are greatly reduced when markets transition from a predominantly 
human interfaced market to machines and electronics – which for any cost sensitive market 
player becomes hugely appealing (Menkveld, 2011). The author supports this notion further 
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by mentioning that market makers prefer to function in a market where transaction costs are 
low or access is immediate.   
From a technological perspective, Menkveld (2011) highlights that a fast matching engine 
allows market making strategies to instantly update quotes as soon as public information has 
entered the market, which reduces the risk of adverse selection. At the same time, the low 
latency technology opens up the trading venue to a market making machine to “ping” the 
market and “test the waters” to gauge investor interest when the strategy tries to dispose of a 
costly inventory position (Menkveld, 2011). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to compare bid-ask 
spreads of the JSE during its floor trading days compared to its current screen-based trading 
system. Without doubt, the spreads would have narrowed considerably but it would be 
significant to see how this improvement in trading and information efficiency has helped to 
reduce spreads. 
3.1.10 Limit Order Market vs. Dealer Market 
Jain (2003) reiterates that the ultimate effectiveness of a stock exchange in performing its 
function of providing liquidity in listed securities can be significantly affected by institutional 
characteristics also known as exchange-design features. 
The various trading mechanisms, such as a pure electronic limit order book, a dealer 
emphasis system and a hybrid mechanism of a periodic call mechanism, all provide liquidity 
on exchanges in varying degrees. Jain (2003) unpacks each type of trading mechanism: 
a) Pure electronic limit order book: orders that enter the market are matched based on 
price and time priority – all unmatched orders are gathered within a consolidated 
order book for succeeding matching; 
b) Dealer emphasis system: liquidity is supplied by brokers who quote bid and ask prices 
at which customers/market participants can trade with them. The downside of this 
mechanism is that customers’ orders could ultimately not enjoy the maximum level of 
exposure; 
c) Hybrid mechanisms:  these are defined as exchanges that utilise a combination of 
limit order book and dealer quotes by designated market makers; 
d) Periodic call mechanism: Jain (2003, p.9) states  that this mechanism is also known as 
the “price fixing mechanism” which gathers orders stretching over a particular period 
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and then finally does a batch process of these orders at a single price that would 
maximise volume. 
Certain market mechanisms are more appealing to investors than others. Viswanathan and 
Wang (2002) highlight that risk-indifferent or risk-neutral investors prefer the limit order 
book structure, but that investors with an appetite for risk would prefer a dealer emphasis 
system. Glosten (1994) also states that the limit order book is the premium exchange 
structure as it offers the highest level of liquidity. In addition to these views, Jain (2003) cites 
Parlour and Seppi (2001) who believe that hybrid trading mechanisms can offer competition 
and operate and function alongside limit order book markets. 
The study by Jain (2003) is important as it takes an in-depth look at whether the performance 
differences are actually found in the institutional differences across 51 international 
exchanges. Again, comparing trading costs on NYSE, a hybrid market and then on 
NASDAQ, a dealer market does not capture all the conceivable exchange designs, for 
example, using a pure limit order book (Jain, 2003). The author finds that the impact of 
individual institutional features such as the provision of automatic trade execution, order-flow 
transparency and fragmentation and the role of a market maker, make it very difficult to 
disentangle. This said, the study is successful in removing the gradual increased impact of 
each institutional feature on the ultimate performance of an exchange (Jain, 2003). 
The main results of the study by Jain (2003) show that the institutional features of each 
exchange examined prove to be the key determinants of liquidity in its listed securities. The 
author controlled for firm-specific, market-specific and country-specific factors and found 
that the various exchanges’ institutional traits had significant explanatory power in actually 
establishing the differences in the exchanges’ liquidity performance.  Specifically, Jain 
(2003) found that quoted spreads, effective spreads and volatility are at higher levels within 
dealer emphasis trading mechanisms than in pure electronic limit order book or hybrid 
mechanism trading systems. Within developed markets, hybrid mechanisms showed to have 
slightly lower average spreads than when examining pure electronic limit order book trading 
mechanisms (Jain, 2003). However, the author found the differences were quite significant 
within emerging markets. The author continues to assert that certain exchange features such 
as lower tick sizes, functioning market makers, a consolidated limit order book, automatic 
trade execution system and ante order-flow centralisation are all linked to lower bid-ask 
spreads. 
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In comparing limit order markets and dealer markets Wuyts (2007) supports Biais, Foucault 
and Salanie (1998) who find that theoretically the dealer market offers a large spread and 
inefficient risk sharing whereas limit order markets have more efficient prices. Pagano and 
Roell (1996) supports this as they find that an auction market charges reduced trading costs 
compared to a dealer market, which is consistent with the notion that the limit order book is 
more transparent compared to a dealer market. 
Wuyts (2007) states that within a dealer market (quote driven market) there are three reasons 
for the existence of a spread, namely order handling and processing costs, inventory costs and 
asymmetric information. Within a limit order market, however, traders who are supplying 
liquidity can still be anticipated to need compensation for order handling costs but because no 
trader is obligated to make a market and take the opposite position to each trade leg, 
inventory risk is less likely to be of any significance (Wuyts, 2007). 
A limit order market however, has no dealers or market makers whose responsibility and duty 
it is to offer liquidity (Wuyts, 2007). The author states that liquidity is only provided by 
traders and their unexecuted limit orders. Therefore, if the supply of limit orders dwindles it 
has a knock-on effect on trading. In addition, the author believes that all the dimensions of 
liquidity are established by the relationship between market orders which are demanding 
liquidity and limit orders which are supplying liquidity. 
 
Glosten (1994) finds that a limit order market has a positive bid-ask spread due to the 
possibility of trading on private information. Handa, Schwarts and Tiwari (2003) also show 
that the width of the spread is determined by the difference in valuation amongst investors 
and because of adverse selection. Ultimately, the process of how information is reflected in 
stock prices through the facilitation of a limit order market is different from a quote driven or 
a hybrid system (Wuyts, 2007). 
A study by Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) shows that the resiliency of the limit order 
market heightens in proportion to patient traders and the waiting costs, but that it decreases 
with the order arrival rate. Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) find through their model that 
during equilibrium, fewer patient traders are inclined to demand liquidity compared to more 
patient traders who are more likely to supply it. Also, the authors find that there is a positive 
relationship between the duration until a transaction occurs and the market resiliency. The 
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authors suggest that the resiliency of the limit order book is always bigger when there is a 
minimum price variation (change) than when there is none.   
 
The second liquidity dimension examined by Wuyts (2007) is that of prices and depth. The 
author cites Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) who find that dealers modify their prices and 
depth in response to various events occurring in the market. The authors also find that depths 
are revised in response to transactions of any particular size but prices are only really 
modified when transaction sizes are greater than the quoted depth.  In addition, these authors 
uncover that dealers respond more powerfully to alterations within the limit order book. 
 
The JSE Equity Market is a limit order market and ultimately, within a limit order market, all 
the dimensions of liquidity including bid-ask spread, depth, immediacy and resiliency are 
established by the relationship and interaction between market orders demanding liquidity 
and limit orders, supplying liquidity (Wuyts, 2007). 
3.1.11 Designated Market Makers 
A designated market maker’s duty and to a large degree, their obligation, is to supply bid and 
offer quotes and serve as the counterparty to incoming orders by managing and trading for 
their own book (Jain 2003). 
Designated market makers are considered helpful in improving liquidity particularly when 
the market depth is not adequate and is devoid of synchronisation (Jain 2003). Some authors 
try to unpack how market makers function within the different trading mechanisms that exist, 
such as Glosten (1994), who foretells that limit order book markets are able to provide the 
greatest level of liquidity possible and that any competition brought on by other exchanges is 
either unprofitable or redundant. Jain (2003) explains that this means that market makers do 
not contribute liquidity above that offered by a pure electronic limit order book system. 
Glosten (1994) supports this by stating that no trader is worse off and that actually many 
traders are better off with an open limit order book structure than a system that allows 
monopolistic specialists. In the same vein, Jain (2003) cites Black (1995) who forecasts that 
with automated pure limit order books, dealers will not make profits and as a result, 
exchanges will not have market makers. An author that has a more negative view regarding 
market makers, cited by Jain (2003), is Rock (1989) who believes that market makers 
actually disrupt trading against pure limit order books and encourage second order adverse 
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selection. Another view by Stoll (1998), also referred to by Jain (2003) is that by introducing 
competition across markets there is a reduction in the willingness of market makers to steady 
the markets and that electronic trading and technology also no longer make the role and 
importance of market makers sustainable even within dealer markets. 
Relating this back to the JSE Equity Market, this market does not have a designated market 
maker programme, however it does require products such as exchange traded funds, 
exchange traded notes and warrants to be traded by market makers to ensure liquidity and 
price discovery. 
3.2 Characteristics of Liquid Markets 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) state that a liquid market exhibits five general characteristics: 
a) Tightness: low transaction costs and low implicit costs; 
b) Immediacy: the speed with which orders can be executed, cleared and settled; 
c) Depth: the abundance of orders, which include actual and those easily found by 
buyers and sellers; 
d) Breadth: orders are plentiful and large in volume with minimal impact on prices; 
e) Resiliency: new orders flow quickly to correct order imbalances which result in 
prices moving away from its fundamental prices. 
 
Wuyts (2007) emphasises that these characteristics or dimensions are interrelated and do not 
stand independently.  
3.2.1 Tightness 
The magnitude of transaction costs viewed as frictions can have a profound effect on a 
market’s attractiveness and therefore its liquidity (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). The authors 
mention that high transaction costs ultimately destroy demand for trades and naturally reduce 
the number of potentially active investors in a market.   
Moreover, the authors state that high transaction costs reduce the demand for trades and 
ultimately the number of market participants that could potentially participate actively in the 
market. Sarr and Lybek (2002) argue that the result of this is possible fragmentation as 
numerous transactions can occur within the market makers’ spreads and not really around the 
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equilibrium or fundamental price in the market. The authors conclude that the consequence is 
a shallow market. 
However, when transaction costs are small, market participants opt to use dealers in auction 
driven markets rather than incur costs in searching for a counterparty (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
Transactions are then more likely to occur around the equilibrium price with the result being 
a market with more depth (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
As mentioned above, high transaction costs mean that fewer market participants are willing to 
transact in the market. Therefore, fewer participants in the market mean that depth in the 
market diminishes (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). Similarly, the authors state that large transaction 
costs reduce resiliency because the elasticity of order flows decreases. This prevents orders 
from flowing quickly in order to correct order imbalances and influences prices away from 
the fundamental price (Sarr and Lybek, 2002).  
It is important to note the theoretical foundation on which market liquidity is underpinned, 
namely the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen, 2005).  
The authors refer to a particular assumption of CAPM where markets are frictionless (that is, 
perfectly liquid) where each instrument can be traded at zero cost constantly and that market 
participants accept the market price. 
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) argue that alleviating frictions is expensive but that 
institutions, who attempted to alleviate these frictions, might be able to earn income. The 
authors explain that frictions include costs related to setting up markets, trading systems, 
legal cost and information and communication systems etc. The authors conclude that if 
frictions did not affect prices then these institutions that attempted to alleviate fictions would 
not be rewarded or compensated and as such, no one would have the motivation to alleviate 
these frictions. Based on these assumptions, markets cannot be frictionless. 
3.2.2 Immediacy 
In unpacking immediacy, Wuyts (2007) suggests that a particular reason why traders would 
prefer faster execution of orders is that slower execution speeds naturally increase the risk or 
uncertainty over the execution price. In fact,  the author refers to Boehmer, Jennings and Wei 
(2006) who prove that markets seem to receive greater volumes of order flow if either the 
execution costs decline or the speed at which execution is done, has increased. Naturally, 
liquidity is affected. Conversely to this, Wuyts (2007) cites Boehmer (2005) who found a 
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negative relationship between execution speed and costs when examining NASDAQ and 
NYSE stocks. Furthermore, the author found that execution is more costly on NASDAQ but 
also faster and that the difference in cost decreases monotonically with order size but that the 
difference in speed actually increases monotonically with order size. 
3.2.3 Depth and Breadth 
In the absence of breadth and depth, Sarr and Lybek (2002) highlight that due to a lack of 
continuous information that frequent market participants provide, the result could be 
discontinuities and uncertainty regarding equilibrium or fundamental prices.   
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) support this notion as the authors show that information 
asymmetries are vital to market equilibrium. They argue that if all information was contained 
in the security prices, no one would have the incentive to collate this information initially. 
As the number of market participants decrease as a result of high transaction costs, so too is 
breadth and resiliency affected (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). The authors state that breadth 
suggests that there are a large number of market participants and therefore high trading fees 
result in shallow or thin markets. Again, the authors mention that as a knock-on effect, 
resiliency is reduced as orders are inhibited from flowing in quickly to stabilise any order 
imbalances that force prices into a state of disequilibrium.  
Wuyts (2007) offers an example of where width and depth are dependent on immediacy. If a 
trader is patient and does not require an immediate trade, they could get more favourable 
prices and/or be in the position to trade a bigger amount at certain prices. 
In examining volume-based measures, Sarr and Lybek (2002) state that these measures are 
ideal for measuring breadth which encompasses numerous and large orders in volume with 
little transaction price impact. According to the authors, markets that are deep are able to 
foster and encourage breadth as large orders can be broken up into much smaller orders and 
thus limit the impact on transaction prices. Hence, this suggests a favourable impact on 
liquidity. 
3.2.4 Resiliency 
Lastly, Wuyts (2007) unpacks resiliency which is defined as the speed with which market 
prices revert to original price levels following a change in prices. This results from a 
significant order flow disparity induced by uniformed traders (noise traders).  
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4 MEASURING LIQUIDITY 
 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) cite (Baker 1996, p.1) who states that there is “no single 
unambiguous, theoretically correct or universally accepted definition of liquidity”. 
Significantly, liquidity can also be seen as a variety of liquidity types and the concept of 
liquidity as a whole is used to describe these different types (Sarr and Lybek, 2002).  As 
alluded to previously, Liu (2006) believes that current liquidity measurements are only 
capable of examining a single dimension of liquidity, which is problematic when liquidity is 
deemed multidimensional. Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) support this by 
reiterating that liquidity is a complex concept. Being mindful of this, it is clear that measuring 
liquidity requires using a number of proxies.  
Sarr and Lybek (2002) differentiate between the varieties of liquidity as follows: 
a) Asset liquidity refers to an asset that can be easily converted into legal tender with 
the key themes being transaction costs (or lack thereof) and immediacy; 
b) An asset’s market liquidity has a broader definition of asset liquidity in that it still 
entails the ease with which, given no new information, it is available to change an 
asset’s fundamental price, big volumes of the asset can be quickly liquidated at a 
sensible price; 
c) A financial market’s liquidity is dependent on assets’ substitutes and how liquid these 
appear to be; and 
d) Lastly, institutional liquidity focuses on the ease with which financial institutions can 
transact with the objective of rapidly covering mismatches between their firm’s assets 
and liabilities. 
According to Sarr and Lybek (2002) an asset is deemed liquid if low transaction costs are 
involved, trading is seamless, settlement is timely and large value trades have little to no 
impact on the market price. The authors continue by stating that liquidity in itself and its 
characteristics is an evolving ‘animal’ that changes based on the stability of the environment.   
Regarding the measurement of liquidity, Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) argue that 
the measurements used to measure liquidity, or proxies of liquidity, do not accurately capture 
the characteristics of liquidity. The authors remark that numerous studies have suggested 
liquidity measures derived from daily return and volume data could serve as proxies for 
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liquidity and transaction costs faced by investors. The authors add that a predominant 
assumption of a range of studies is that available liquidity proxies capture and reflect the 
transaction costs of market participants. The authors, however, do concede that this 
assumption has not been tested due to inadequate trading costs data. Goyenko, Holden and 
Trzcinka (2009) ultimately conclude that testing these liquidity proxies using actual trading 
data means that little agreement can be reached on which liquidity measures are better. 
Because many studies use liquidity proxies using monthly or even more granular data, 
Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) mention that there is a need for these proxies to be 
tested on a monthly basis. In addition, studies have suggested a variety of liquidity proxies 
which intend to reflect different liquidity benchmarks such as effective spread, realised 
spread or price impact (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009). The authors therefore 
conclude that because there are few liquidity proxies tested, few liquidity benchmarks and a 
lack of monthly proxies, it is not startling that there are conflicting views about which 
measure is better and whether these measures sufficiently capture the transaction costs.  
4.1    Liquidity Measures 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) state that liquidity measures can ultimately be classified into four 
different categories: 
a) Transaction cost measures: encapsulate costs of trading and trading frictions within 
the secondary market; 
b) Volume-based measures: breadth and depth of a market is measured; 
c) Equilibrium price-based measures: attempt to capture orderly movements towards 
equilibrium prices i.e. resiliency; 
d) Market-impact measures: examine the differences between price movements as a 
result of overall market conditions or the introduction of new information. 
Again, Sarr and Lybek (2002) conclude that there is no single measure that clearly measures 
and reflects tightness, immediacy, breadth and resiliency. 
4.1.1 Transaction Cost Measures 
4.1.1.1  Bid-Ask Spread 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) state that as a transaction cost measurement for liquidity, the bid-ask 
spread is the most all-encompassing measurement as it is able to not only capture explicit 
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costs but implicit costs as well. It is therefore the most commonly used measure of 
transaction (execution) costs (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
The calculation  of the bid-ask spread as discussed by Sarr and Lybek (2002) entails using the 
highest bid and the lowest ask prices in the market for a particular time, or as is the norm in 
the market to use the latest figures. The authors caution that if there are many bid and ask 
prices from various market participants, it would be prudent to ignore the most extreme 
outliers. 
Grossman and Miller (1988) discuss some of the limitations of the bid-ask spread as a 
measure of liquidity. The authors argue that this measure evaluates the market maker’s return 
for supplying immediacy but only in the instance in which the market maker “crosses” the 
trade, that is, executes on the bid side and then on the offer or ask side. Thus, the spread is 
seen purely as a charge by the market maker for transacting orders, as opposed to supplying 
liquidity services meaning the bid-ask spread does not serve as a reliable measure (Grossman 
and Miller, 1988). 
With their model in mind, Grossman and Miller (1988) state that orders do not arrive at the 
same time and that instead the orders are arbitrarily split over time. Therefore, because the 
price of a security may change constantly between the time at which the market maker buys 
and sells the security, realistically the market maker may reap much more or even much less 
than the spread quoted initially at the time of the buy or sell transaction (Grossman and 
Miller, 1988). Similarly to what the authors mentioned above, the currently quoted spread 
cannot assist any market participant in offering an accurate measure of the cost of trading 
immediately as opposed to delaying the order. Grossman and Miller (1988) state that the 
advantage of immediacy to a customer is the detaching of the price risk linked with waiting.   
According to Jain (2003), certain features such as lower tick sizes, designated marker makers, 
a consolidated limit order book, automatic trade execution system and the centralisation of 
order flow, are all associated with lower bid-ask spreads. 
4.1.2 Volume-Based Measures 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) believe that volume-based measures, such as the turnover ratio and 
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio, are the best at determining breadth in the market. The authors 
remark that deep markets mean that large orders can be broken up into smaller orders to 
reduce the impact it could have on transaction prices. The authors continue that a large 
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number of trades are an ideal source of information not only to traders but dealers as well. 
These participants gather information about order flows and the imbalances in the order flow 
and then supply market participants with a sense of how accurate their quoted prices are (Sarr 
and Lybek, 2002).  
4.1.2.1 Turnover Ratio 
The turnover ratio examines the number of times the total number of shares of a particular 
company was traded compared to the total number of shares in issue for that company. The 
higher the turnover ratio; the greater the liquidity of that particular security. 
According to Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the turnover ratio is in fact negatively related 
to illiquidity costs. In equilibrium, the more illiquid securities are allocated to investors with 
lower trading frequencies who repay the illiquidity cost over a longer period of time, thus 
alleviating the loss due to the asset’s illiquidity costs (Amihud, 2002). 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) believe that a drawback of the turnover ratio is that it can be 
particularly volatile as trading volume changes constantly not only during the day but also 
during the week and month. 
4.1.2.2 Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio (ILLIQ) 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) states that the formation of Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 
(ILLIQ) came about with the hypothesis that stock expected return is an increasing function 
of stock illiquidity.  
The ratio is fairly easy to apply to data, truly a benefit when considering the numerous 
exchanges around the world and each exchange’s varying level of available data (Amihud, 
2002).  ILLIQ is each stock’s daily ratio of absolute stock return to its value traded and then 
averaged based on the number of trading days for each stock per year. Amihud (2002,  p.32) 
explains it as being the “daily price response associated with one dollar of trading volume, 
thus serving as a rough measure of price impact”. The author also highlights that this 
measurement is useful as it is easy to calculate. Daily stock data is generally available from 
most stock exchanges where in most markets microstructure data is very difficult to come by 
and because of time series data it is possible to examine the illiquidity-return relationship 
over an extended period of time (Amihud, 2002). The formula for ILLIQ is shown on the 
next page in Equation 1. 
28 
 
Equation 1:  Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio (ILLIQ) 
ILLIQ = |Riyt|/VOLDiyt 
|Riyt| refers to the absolute return on stock i on day t of year y and VOLDiyt is the daily volume 
in Rands. After each year y, the illiquidity measure of stock t is averaged using the number of 
days for which stock i was traded in year y. 
The ILLIQ measurement does have a particular advantage over other measurements, such as 
the Amivest measure. Amihud (2002) refers to this measure, which is very similar to the 
ILLIQ and cites Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) and Berkman and Elsewarapu 
(1998). These authors used this Amivest measure to determine the effect of changes in 
liquidity on the values of stocks that were prone to changes. The authors found that the 
measurement did not possess the instinctive interpretation of gauging the average daily link 
between one unit of volume and the stock’s price change, as is the case with ILLIQ. 
Zhang (2010) recognises that some liquidity measures actually require the use of high 
frequency transaction and quote data, which is not always readily available, particularly in 
emerging markets. Instead, the author mentions that several low frequency liquidity proxies 
exist and cites the following authors and their measurements, namely the Roll measure (Roll, 
1984), Zeros measure (Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka, 1999), Amihud’s illiquidity ratio 
(Amihud, 2002), the Gibbs measure (Hasbrouck, 2009) and Liu’s LMx measure (Liu, 2006). 
However, Zhang (2010) states that though the basic assumption is that the liquidity measures 
are capable of capturing actual liquidity, this has not been examined fully and the possibility 
exists that in using different liquidity measures to address the same issue, the results could be 
contradictory. 
Another point to consider, although not part of the outcomes of this study, is that emerging 
markets could mean that liquidity is measured with more noise compared to liquidity that is 
measured in more established markets such as the US (Zhang, 2010). The author makes a 
point that typically within emerging markets, retail investors have much lower levels of 
disposable income to invest in the capital market and arguably have limited means to access 
information. Zhang (2010) therefore believes that these factors mean that emerging markets 
typically see low trading activity and therefore trading frequency plays a significant role 
especially within emerging markets. The aforementioned existing liquidity proxies hardly 
take this into account (Zhang, 2010). 
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Goyenko, Holden & Trzcinka (2009) highlight that whichever measure is used depends on 
what the researcher needs to measure. The authors state that the ILLIQ and Amivest 
measurements are not suitable proxies for measuring effective or realised spreads. Instead, 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio is applicable when wanting to measure price impact (Goyenko, 
Holden & Trzcinka, 2009). 
Amihud (2002) also mentions, apart from the ILLIQ measure, measurements such as turnover 
ratio, market capitalisation and trading volume can all be seen as empirical proxies that 
evaluate different facets of illiquidity.  
4.1.3 Price-Based Measures 
4.1.3.1 Market-Efficiency Coefficient (MEC) 
Hasbrouk and Schwartz (1988) suggest a market efficiency coefficient to discern between 
short-term and long-term price changes when new information enters the market. 
The market-efficiency coefficient (MEC) observes that price changes are mostly 
uninterrupted in liquid market places even if new information is influencing equilibrium or 
fundamental prices (Sarr and Lybek, 2002).  It is argued that given permanent price changes, 
the temporary changes to that price should be very slight in a resilient market (Sarr and 
Lybek, 2002). The authors explain that an MEC ratio of just below one indicates that the 
market is more resilient as only minimum amounts of short-term volatility are anticipated. 
They, however, continue to mention that instruments’ prices that have low resiliency may 
also showcase more volatility and therefore more temporary changes during the periods in 
which their equilibrium price is changing. Sarr and Lybek (2002) indicate that factors that 
promote excessive short-term volatility include price rounding, spreads and inaccurate price 
discovery. The authors conclude that the result is that short-term period volatility is 
diminished relatively to longer-term volatility meaning that the MEC ratio moves above one. 
Low levels of volatility are associated with orderly and resilient markets which offer much 
better price continuity – a desirable attribute of liquid markets (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
The authors conclude that the MEC ratio determined over an extended period of time which 
covers notable discrete price changes could still be deemed an appropriate measure of 
resiliency.  But, Sarr and Lybek (2002) mention that the measure may not be true for all types 
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of markets with some detractors arguing that quote driven markets largely provide price 
continuity versus those markets that are order or call driven. 
4.1.4 Market-Impact Measures 
4.1.4.1 Market-Adjusted Liquidity 
The market-adjusted liquidity measurement attempts to capture the price movement due to 
large volumes, that is, breadth (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
Because of this, a regression model based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used 
to relate the  residual of a regression of the security’s return on the return of the market to 
ascertain the intrinsic liquidity of the security (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). The regression reveals 
that the lower the impact of trading volume on the changes of a security’s price, the more 
liquid the asset is (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
4.1.4.2 Price Impact 
Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk (2002) develop a measure of liquidity called price impact, 
which examines the magnitude with which a firm’s share price changes when taking its 
traded volumes into account. The authors mention that price impact encapsulates the degree 
to which a transaction regarding a particular security affects that security’s market price.  
Therefore, a very liquid asset will show very little price impact when traded, whereas illiquid 
securities cannot trade at any available price (Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk, 2002). The 
authors argue that their measurement incorporates vital dimensions of liquidity which are not 
captured by the bid-ask spread and quoted depth. 
The authors, however, find that the predicted price impact overstates the actual price impact 
for not only very large trades, but for trades that are executed more patiently and for trades 
where the institutional investors pay larger commissions. 
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5 TECHNOLOGY 
 
The scope of this study is not only to examine the effect that the JSE trading engine upgrade 
has had on JSE Equity Market liquidity (with regard to ordinary shares), but also to 
understand how technological advancements have changed the exchange’s micro market 
structure landscape and therefore its effect on liquidity trends. Technology has without a 
doubt transformed the way that electronic trading is done in the market.   
Jain (2003) reiterates that factors such as rising globalisation, cross listings and even foreign 
portfolio investments have aggravated the levels of competition already evident between 
international exchanges. Apart from these factors, technology and its advancements have 
without a doubt turned the exchange world and the way it has always done business, on its 
head.   
5.1 Evolution of Electronic Trading 
The evolution of electronic trading has grown in leaps and bounds over the last 15 years. The 
technological advancements have to a degree been driven by a natural demand for greater and 
faster access to markets but were also driven by regulatory changes through the introduction 
of Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in the US and Markets in Financial 
Markets Directive (MiFID) within Europe. These legislative directives ultimately opened the 
capital markets up to increased competition for traditional exchanges through the 
establishment of Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and Electronic Crossing Networks 
(ECNs). With the increased competition, fragmentation increased and with that an increased 
desire to enter and exit each of these different trading venues as quickly and as lucratively as 
possible. Increased technological advancements also led to the birth of algorithmic trading 
and high frequency trading (HFT). Deutsche Bank Research (2011) shows that these two 
strategies differ, where the former is aimed at diminishing the negative impact of large 
institutional orders and high frequency traders (HFTs) opt to hold short-term positions but do 
not carry these positions over to the next trading day. 
The increased competition in the US and Europe is largely due to the large number of trading 
venues within these jurisdictions, according to Menkveld (2011). The author continues that 
the number of trading venues and the resultant competition has reduced bid-ask spreads and 
therefore the transaction costs as well.   
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A growing trend over the last ten years or so has involved the consolidation of numerous 
regional and small international exchanges, particularly in Europe (Jain, 2003). Examples of 
such mergers include the formation of Euronext which consists of the exchanges within 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris, plus Scandinavian exchanges have also merged to form 
NASDAQ OMX (Jain, 2003). The proliferation of multiple trading venues especially within 
Europe was largely driven by the European Union’s regulatory changes with the introduction 
of MiFID (Menkveld, 2011). The directive ultimately allowed national exchanges to 
compete, which encouraged new markets to appear (Menkveld, 2011).  
With the introduction of trading venues such as BATS Chi-X Europe
2
 and Turquoise
3
 which 
both offer high speed access to stocks through low fee structures – two very attractive factors 
for market participants concerned about liquidity and narrow margins – these venues 
gradually encroached on market share held by LSE and NYSE Euronext (Europe) 
(Menkveld, 2011). 
Speed is quickly becoming the currency of the markets. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) state that 
speed is vitally important to traders due to the innate volatility of financial instruments. Speed 
also allows for the ultimate desire to create profitable opportunities by being the “quickest to 
market”. This race has driven “speed players” to implement state-of-the-art technology and 
use of proximity or co-location services that allow immediate access to the market’s trading 
engine. The authors suggest that the world of speed has now entered a millisecond domain 
where algorithms can respond to each other at speeds equivalent to 100 times faster than it 
would take a human to blink. 
Brogaard (2010) supports this by citing Hendershott and Moulton (2007) who found that an 
average trade on NYSE took approximately ten seconds to execute, but due to  technological 
advancements and the introduction of HFT, some firms are able to trade their entire strategy 
of buying and selling, multiples times within a mere second. Brogaard (2010) states that the 
reason for these very high speeds is twofold, namely the change from stock prices originally 
quoted in eighths to now being decimalised has created the opportunity for instant price 
variation. Because of the minute price changes, trading is less risky, as trading is done within 
                                                     
2
 A Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) that offers a low cost trading venue for instruments listed on other 
major exchanges.  
3
 An MTF that also offers a low cost trading venue for instruments listed on other major exchanges.  
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short investment/time horizons with price movements in cents as opposed to eighths of a US 
dollar. 
However, contrasting results of a study by Hendershott and Moulton (2007), cited by 
Brogaard (2010) which examined the introduction of NYSE’s Hybrid Market in 2006, found 
that reduction in latency due to the engine’s expanded automatic execution and reduced 
execution time from ten seconds to less than one second, actually widened spreads but 
bettered information efficiency. However, Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012) found that a 
reduction in latency improved the liquidity on the Deutsche Boerse. Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2013), therefore suggest that the impact of a change in latency on market quality is really 
dependent on how much competition there is amongst liquidity suppliers and the ability of 
liquidity demanders to adopt algorithms and implement dynamic limit order strategies. 
5.2 Algorithmic Trading (AT) 
Algorithmic trading (AT) is a more complex version of electronic trading but which has set 
limitations determined by a set of rules. Brogaard (2010) differentiates between AT and HFT.  
Ultimately, AT is similar to HFT but fundamentally different in that AT has longer holding 
periods varying between trading: minutes, days, weeks and longer. The author notes that HFT 
is defined by holding positions for exceedingly short periods of time with the intention to end 
the day neutral. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) explain that algorithms define the 
timing, price, quantity and order routing, whilst regulating market conditions for various 
securities and trading venues, ultimately reducing the market impact often experienced with 
the execution of large orders. 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) state that not all algorithms play the same role in the market and 
that acknowledging algorithm objectives, could stimulate patterns in market data and impact 
market quality. Menkveld (2011) differentiates between agency and proprietary algorithms as 
not all algorithmic activity is the same. Typically, agency algorithms are utilised by buy-side 
institutions as they help to reduce the cost of executing trades by breaking up large orders 
into pieces that are then sent to multiple trading venues over a period of time (Menkveld, 
2011). Naturally, such an arrangement is not currently possible within the South African 
market, as the JSE is the only domestic trading venue. The authors note that the main feature 
of agency algorithms is that much of the decision making in terms of which stocks to trade 
and the quantity to be traded, is done by the portfolio manager.  The intention of these 
algorithms is to keep execution costs relative to a specific benchmark to a minimum 
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(Menkveld, 2011). These market participants, as explained by the authors, essentially demand 
liquidity even when their strategies might make use of non-marketable limit orders.   
When looking at proprietary algorithms, they are considered more diverse and more difficult 
to categorise. The overarching characteristic though, remains speed. Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2013, p.1) refer to low latency trading as typically “strategies that respond to market events 
in the millisecond environment”. 
5.3 High Frequency Trading (HFT) 
Deutsche Bank Research (2011) explains that the history of HFT started with electronic 
trading with the electronification of execution venues in the late 1990s which allowed market 
participants to gain remote access to electronic order books.   
HFT can be seen as a subset or category of AT, where a large number of orders (of small 
size) are filtered into the market at incredible processing speeds (Brogaard, 2010). HFTs in 
essence take advantage of miniscule price disparities in the market but due to the high speed 
advantage, these participants are able to generate substantial profits (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2011). 
Deutsche Bank Research (2011) clarifies that HFT is not a trading strategy, instead it is 
considered to be a more technologically advanced way of applying certain trading strategies.  
Whether HFT improves liquidity is debateable as Deutsche Bank Research (2011, p.3) views 
the liquidity provided by these participants to be “opportunistic liquidity provision”, as 
entering and exiting the market with a large position is very difficult. 
Because of offerings such as co-location, where the market participant can place their servers 
in close proximity to the trading engine, HFT can take full force and blossom to its full 
potential. HFT players are known to transact in the market at incredible speeds whilst also 
generating the majority of the message activity (such as orders) in these capital markets. 
5.3.1 HFT and Liquidity 
Brogaard (2010, p.1) states that HFTs tend to argue that they enhance liquidity, improve price 
discovery and lower volatility, but contrasting views in the market believe that HFTs 
aggravate volatility, dry up liquidity and profit at the expense of investors considered to be 
more “traditional”. 
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Brogaard (2010) also examined HFT market behaviour and found that HFTs trade securities 
with more significant market capitalisation, that have lower market-to-book ratios, more 
narrow spreads, less depth and much lower levels of non-HFT trading volume. In particular, 
the trading strategies employed are heavily dependent on past returns and past order 
imbalances. Many views exist around the actual effect on volatility when HFT activity is 
prevalent. Brogaard (2010) found that HFTs tend to lower their supply of liquidity somewhat 
and enlarge their need for liquidity as volatility increases on a daily basis. 
Deutsche Bank Research (2011) cites studies by Hendershott and Riordan (2009) and 
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) who indicate that HFT, through market making and 
arbitrage strategies, had indeed enhanced liquidity, narrowed spreads and helped to align 
market prices across various trading venues/markets. According to the research team, little to 
no research supports the notion that HFT does not contribute towards liquidity. A noteworthy 
argument though, is that HFTs generally only trade instruments that have a certain level of 
liquidity that is lucrative for the trader, that is, liquidity begets liquidity. Deutsche Bank 
Research (2011), however, highlight some key concerns: 
a) there is no obligation from the HFT to provide market making duties; 
b) due to the small sizes of HFT orders, they contribute a limited amount to market 
depth; and 
c) because of the short duration, liquidity might be accessible before these orders are 
cancelled so HFT quotes are hardly accessible. 
5.3.2 HFT and Market Quality 
Apart from liquidity, Brogaard (2010) also examined whether HFT contributes to price 
formation/discovery within equity markets.   
A contentious point around HFT is whether it employs an investing strategy that is engaged 
in front-running.  Brogaard (2010) believes that HFTs are in the position to sense when other 
market participants anticipate a large order of securities and thus enter into the same position 
as these other market participants before they are able to transact. The end result, because of 
this interception, would mean that costs are driven up to a level where non-high frequency 
traders transact the preferred transaction (Brogaard, 2010). The author concludes in his 
findings that HFTs are seen as a collective are therefore not using front-running as their key 
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strategy. However, he is unable to conclude that there is no front-running either so the results 
regarding front-running are therefore inconclusive. 
To determine whether HFTs use similar strategies to aggravate market movements, Brogaard 
(2010) looks at the frequency at which HFTs trade with each other and cites the benchmark 
model used by Chaboud, Hjalmarsson, Vega, and Chiquoine (2009). The author concludes 
that HFTs take part in a much smaller diverse group of strategies than when compared to 
non-HFTs. Rather, the diverse strategies result in one HFT opting to buy and another HFT to 
sell at the same time (Brogaard, 2010). 
Hasbrouk and Saar (2013) investigate the impact of high frequency trading on the market 
environment through a newly designed measure. The measure looks at how low latency 
trading activity changes during periods of normal continuous trading, when prices decline 
significantly and when economic uncertainty is intensified.  The results show that greater 
levels of low latency trading aids in narrowing bid-ask spreads, strengthening the depth of the 
central order book and also decreases short-term volatility. 
Even though the general consensus regarding the impact that low latency activity have on 
market quality, is positive, Brogaard (2010) and Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2012), 
cited by Menkveld (2011), note that low latency activity could impact the market negatively 
during times of significant market stress. The example of the “Flash Crash” on 6 May 2010 is 
a prime example of how some believe high frequency trading created difficulties within the 
operations of the NYSE Equity Market. 
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6 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data sample in this research includes data for ZA01 (Top 40), ZA02 (Mid Cap) and 
ZA03 (Less Liquid) stocks listed on the JSE Equity Market, for the period 2 July 2005 to 1 
July 2013.  This particular data period was selected due to data availability and due to that the 
fact that it covered events such as the JSE trading engine upgrade in 2007, the occurrence of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the second JSE trading engine upgrade in 2012. For 
purposes of simplicity, only ordinary shares are considered in the data sample, as these 
instruments comprise the majority of the traded instrument types on the exchange. The stocks 
vary in liquidity with ZA01 typically viewed as the most liquid shares listed on the JSE, 
ZA02 the second most liquid and ZA03 the least liquid.  
Continuity is important, therefore stocks that were not listed for every year during the sample 
period were removed from the sample data. In addition, the ILLIQ measure was used as the 
benchmark therefore if a particular stock returned a zero average for each year in question, 
this stock too was removed from the sample. In cleaning the data this way, the number of 
eligible stocks in the sample decreased from roughly 400 stocks per year to 91 stocks that 
remained listed throughout the data sample period. Another point to consider is that the 
sample data used includes central order book data and off-order book data (reported trades), 
whereas some liquidity measurements (Average Spread) only include central order book data. 
Therefore, liquidity measurements such as the Average Spread and JSE Liquidity (which 
excludes reported trades) will be a better central order book liquidity measurement. This 
creates the challenge that the comparison of the liquidity measurements against each other 
will not be based on an equal footing. However, because the majority of all JSE Equity 
Market activity occurs within the central order book, there is still some comfort from 
knowing that a liquidity comparison will be possible. 
The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether liquidity improved or diminished over 
the data sample period using different liquidity measurements, whether these liquidity 
measurements are in any way connected to each other and lastly whether the trading engine 
upgrade in 2012 and the introduction of low latency trading strategies improved liquidity.  
The analysis of the data is divided into four parts. 
a) Part one:  Each measurement of liquidity mentioned on the next page is calculated for 
each July-to-July year starting 2 July 2005 to 1 July 2013.  In doing so, the intention 
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is to examine the liquidity trends following the trading engine upgrade in July 2007, 
the GFC and the second trading engine upgrade in July 2012.  In addition an ANOVA 
analysis is also conducted for each measurement with the intention of examining 
whether the implementation of the second trading engine upgrade and its impact on 
liquidity was statistically significant: 
a. Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) during each July-to-July year; 
b. Turnover ratio during each July-to-July year; 
c. Average daily value traded per stock during each July-to-July year; 
d. Average market capitalisation of each stock during each July-to-July year; 
e. Average spread per instrument for each July-to-July year; 
f. JSE Liquidity measurement – a JSE calculated liquidity measurement adjusted 
for each July-to-July year. 
 
b) Part two: Each ordinary share is ranked from most to least liquid using each 
aforementioned liquidity measurement for each July-to-July year starting 2 July 2005 
to 1 July 2013. These liquidity rankings are then correlated with each other for each 
July-to-July year, with the intention to ascertain whether the different liquidity 
measurements are in any way related or connected to each other. 
 
c) Part three:  An event study is conducted for the period 1 July 2011 to 1 July 2013. The 
intention of the study is to examine whether the introduction of the trading platform 
Millennium Exchange
TM
 had any impact on the returns of a ZA01, ZA02 and ZA03 
portfolio of instruments. If the impact on portfolio returns is statistically significant, it 
can be interpreted that the trading engine did indeed have an effect on stock returns 
and that in turn liquidity was affected as well. 
 
d) Part four: Lastly, the so-called “computer trading” trading activity and its effect on 
liquidity will be examined. Due to the JSE’s data limitations, algorithmic trading 
activity or HFT cannot be explicitly identified and thus this low latency type of 
trading is referred to as “computer trading” based on assumptions such as certain 
levels of message (order) traffic. The intention is to deduce a positive relationship 
between improved technology, resultant “computer trading” and liquidity. 
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7 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Before examining the results of the analysis, it is important to perhaps take note of Amihud 
(2002) who stated that any attempt to capture liquidity in a single variable is particularly 
difficult and unnecessary as illiquidity is a function of a number of variables each considered 
a proxy for liquidity. With this in mind, one has to take note that trying to isolate certain 
events and subsequently attempting to pinpoint these events as the catalysts for improved or 
diminished liquidity levels, remains a challenge. However, it is hoped that the result of the 
analysis will still offer some insight and evoke some interesting questions. 
When considering the JSE Equity Market liquidity levels, particularly for ordinary shares 
(most traded instrument type on the JSE), there appears to be a slight decrease since July 
2009 shown in Figure 1 on the following page. The liquidity measure used is one calculated 
by the JSE.   
Figure 1 shows an inverse relationship between the JSE Equity Market liquidity levels for 
ordinary shares and the number of ordinary share transactions (trades) from July 2005 to July 
2013. Initially, one would be under the impression that liquidity would have increased 
considering how trading volumes have increased dramatically over the same period. An 
active market would surely translate into a liquid market based on this assumption. 
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Figure 1:  Ordinary Share Liquidity vs. Ordinary Share Transactions 
(2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
 
Given some of the constraints within the JSE data, it is difficult to determine whether the 
higher liquidity levels during 2008 and 2009 were due to the dark side of liquidity as 
mentioned by Wuyts (2007), that is, liquid markets consist of investors that no longer focus 
on fundamentals but rather have a short-term view regarding their investment decisions.  
Perhaps in examining the growth of orders on the JSE Equity Market, it is appropriate to 
suggest that traders are looking to flood the market with excessive orders in order to make 
small profits and therefore are not particularly focused on fundamentals. Deutsche Bank 
Research (2011) mentions particularly that HFT which is considered a subset of algorithmic 
trading (AT) aims to submit large number of orders at significant speeds and take advantage 
of very small price movements. Unfortunately, JSE order or trade data is not defined as either 
HFT or AT and therefore a number of assumptions needed to be made in order to infer low 
latency trading, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
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Figure 2:  JSE Equity Market Market Capitalisation for Ordinary Shares vs. All Share Index 
(1 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
 
Apart from increased trading volumes, the market capitalisation of JSE ordinary shares also 
boomed to record levels along with record JSE All Share Index levels, seen in Figure 2 
above.   
With all these positive elements clearly indicating a robust and active market, why is it that 
liquidity levels appear to have started to diminish? A simple answer might lie with the 
formula used to determine liquidity levels, where increasing market capitalisation is inversely 
correlated with liquidity. One therefore has to ask whether such measurements actually offer 
insight into the “intrinsic” liquidity of a market.   
It is quite evident that liquidity, in its entirety, is firstly a complex concept and secondly that 
it clearly comprises of numerous factors.  It is hoped that this study will shed some light on 
the different liquidity measures currently used and how fundamental changes in technology, 
which clearly have a beneficial effect on trading volumes, have the same beneficial effect on 
liquidity levels. 
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7.1.1 Liquidity Measurements Compared 
7.1.1.1 Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio (ILLIQ) 
As mentioned, Figure 1 shows diminishing ordinary share liquidity levels, using the JSE 
Liquidity measurement which includes all trade types (central order book and off-order book 
trades). Now, using the ILLIQ ratio as the liquidity measurement per ordinary share within 
the sample period, liquidity is once again examined. 
Figure 3 that follows shows how the yearly ILLIQ ratio has changed per instrument for each 
July-to-July year. Spikes in illiquidity (shown in red circles) are particularly evident for 
individual stocks Village Main Reef (VIL), African Dawn Capital (ADW) and ISA Holdings 
(ISA) from 2 July 2007 to 1 July 2010. Stocks such as VIL, ADW and ISA are relatively 
small in relation to market capitalisation, have small daily average trades and their average 
spreads are typically larger than the more liquid Top 40 stocks. Hence, the apparent spikes in 
illiquidity as any relatively change in daily value traded or closing price would mean a large 
variance in the illiquidity of these smaller stocks. 
Figure 4 offers a time series view of the average daily ILLIQ ratio for the total data sample 
period. Illiquidity was particularly more evident from about March 2008 to September 2010 
based on the large outliers during this period (shown in the red circle). However, this period 
was synonymous with the GFC period. Following this time period, the number of ILLIQ ratio 
outliers decreased noticeably, even more so after the trading engine upgrade in July 2012.   
Figure 5 shows that the average yearly ILLIQ ratio has decreased steadily over the data 
sample period. Apart from a large spike during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 (shown in red 
circle), liquidity seemed to strengthen. Following another, but more moderate peak in 
illiquidity during 2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011 (shown in red circle), illiquidity settled at much 
lower levels during the subsequent two July-to-July years, again particularly during the 
period of the trading engine upgrade. Overall, it would appear that liquidity levels improved 
when using this measurement, it would however be presumptuous to think that the sole 
reason for this was the trading engine upgrade before examining the other liquidity 
measurements as well and also conducting a one way ANOVA exercise to determine 
differentiation between each July-to-July year. 
The standard deviation of the yearly ILLIQ ratio, in Table 2, appears much greater during 2 
July 2007 - 1 July 2009 and then again during 2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011. This is in line with 
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the observed outliers in Figure 4 and 5. The averages for each July-to-July year group are 
fairly similar, with the exception of the periods 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2009 and then again 
during 2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011. 
Table 2: Summary Results for Yearly ILLIQ Ratio 
Groups Count Sum Average Standard Deviation 
2 July 2005 - 1 July 2006 91 0.00007509 0.00000083 0.00000372 
2 July 2006 - 1 July 2007 91 0.00005734 0.00000063 0.00000305 
2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 91 0.00027356 0.00000301 0.00002398 
2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009 91 0.00021039 0.00000231 0.00001082 
2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010 91 0.00000590 0.00000006 0.00000030 
2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011 91 0.00020551 0.00000226 0.00001704 
2 July 2011 - 1 July 2012 91 0.00002699 0.00000030 0.00000111 
2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 91 0.00002277 0.00000025 0.00000117 
 
The results of the one-way ANOVA in Table 3 show how the average yearly ILLIQ ratios are 
either different or the same from one July-to-July year group to the next. We state that the 
null hypothesis is that the average yearly ILLIQ ratio for each July-to-July year is the same. 
In other words, the trading engine upgrade has had no significant impact on the average 
yearly ILLIQ ratio for each July-to-July group. The one-way ANOVA results attempt to 
show that the null hypothesis can either be rejected or not rejected. 
 
Table 3: ANOVA Results for Yearly ILLIQ Ratio 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 0.000000001 7 0.00000000012 0.937 0.477 2.022 
Within Groups 0.000000091 720 0.00000000013 
   
Total 0.000000092 727 
    
 
In examining the p-value (0.477) the results show that it is greater than 0.05 and therefore the 
null hypothesis is not rejected and is not statistically significant. It can therefore be 
determined that the average ILLIQ ratio between the July-to-July groups is the same. In the 
same way, the F-statistic of 0.937 is less than the F-critical value and therefore again the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. With this in mind it can be inferred that the implementation of the 
new trading engine in July 2012 did not impact the average yearly ILLIQ ratio between each 
July-to-July year group, and therefore did not impact liquidity.  It is important to remember 
that ILLIQ as Amihud (2002,  p.32) explains it, is the “daily price response associated with 
one dollar of trading volume, thus serving as a rough measure of price impact”. Indirectly one 
could say that the ANOVA results show that the trading engine implementation did perhaps 
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not bring with it significant share price movements/changes, due to the efficiencies within the 
market and liquidity therefore remained relatively consistent. 
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Figure 3: Yearly ILLIQ Ratio per Ordinary Share (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 4: Average Daily ILLIQ Ratio (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 5: Average Yearly ILLIQ Ratio (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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7.1.1.2  Turnover Ratio 
The average turnover ratio appears very volatile during the data sample period. In examining 
the standard deviation in Table 4, it would appear that the ratio is particularly erratic during 2 
July 2007 - 1 July 2010. This is expected as it was during this time period that the GFC came 
into full force. However, the subsequent volatility levels then revert to levels last seen during 
2 July 2005 - 1 July 2007. 
Table 4: Standard Deviation of Average Turnover Ratio (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
 
2 July 
2005 
- 
1 July 
2006 
2 July 
2006 
- 
1 July 
2007 
2 July 
2007 
- 
1 July 
2008 
2 July 
2008 
- 
1 July 
2009 
2 July 
2009 
- 
1 July 
2010 
2 July 
2010 
- 
1 July 
2011 
2 July 
2011 
- 
1 July 
2012 
2 July 
2012 
- 
1 July 
2013 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0019 0.0016 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 
 
Figure 6 shows that average yearly turnover ratio is particularly erratic, therefore making the 
observation of a general trend particularly difficult. When observing VIL, ADW and ISA (in 
red circles), it is evident that these stocks do not appear as particular outliers as was the case 
with the ILLIQ ratio. Instead, the likes of Aveng Limited (AEG), Barloworld Limited (BAW) 
and Murray and Roberts Holdings Limited (MUR) (in the red circles) prove to be the biggest 
peaks in Figure 6. All three stocks are medium liquid securities, forming part of ZA02.   
 
Figure 7 shows the average daily turnover ratio during the data sample period. There is a 
peaked average yearly turnover ratio from about July 2007 to July 2010 (shown in the red 
circle), however, as is expected this declines as the GFC progressed. The average yearly 
turnover ratio then also slightly picks up from 2 July 2012 following the implementation of 
the JSE trading engine upgrade, as seen by the 22-day moving average trend line. Again, 
similarly to the ILLIQ ratio results, it would appear that the average yearly turnover ratio 
(and with that, liquidity) has increased following the trading engine upgrade in July 2012.   
 
The average yearly turnover ratio, shown in Figure 8, highlights the peaks in liquidity (shown 
in the red circles) during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2009. The average yearly turnover ratio 
following the trading engine upgrade in 2012 is fairly similar to the levels seen at the 
beginning of the data sample period. 
49 
 
The standard deviation of the average yearly turnover ratio, in Table 5, appears much greater 
during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2010. This is in line with the observed volatility in Figure 7. The 
averages shown in Table 5 for each July-to-July year group are also fairly similar. 
Table 5: Summary Results for Average Yearly Turnover Ratio 
Groups Count Sum Average Standard Deviation 
2 July 2005 - 1 July 2006 91 0.18427209 0.00202497 0.00125600 
2 July 2006 - 1 July 2007 91 0.19108346 0.00209982 0.00126852 
2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 91 0.22650418 0.00248906 0.00159715 
2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009 91 0.23199763 0.00254942 0.00186828 
2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010 91 0.21245452 0.00233467 0.00159119 
2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011 91 0.18081542 0.00198698 0.00128210 
2 July 2011 - 1 July 2012 91 0.17956403 0.00197323 0.00123491 
2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 91 0.19034187 0.00209167 0.00131152 
 
The results of the one-way ANOVA in Table 6 shows how the average yearly turnover ratios 
are either different or the same from one July-to-July year group to the next. Again, the same 
null hypothesis is used, namely that the average yearly turnover ratio for each July-to-July 
year is the same. In other words, the trading engine upgrade has had no significant impact on 
the average yearly turnover ratio for each July-to-July group.  
 
Table 6: ANOVA Results for Average Yearly Turnover Ratio 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 0.000034 7 0.0000048 2.328 0.024 2.022 
Within Groups 0.001498 720 0.0000021 
   
       
Total 0.001532 727 
    
 
In examining the p-value (0.024) the results show that it is less than 0.05 and therefore the 
null hypothesis is rejected and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It can therefore be 
determined that the average yearly turnover ratio between the July-to-July groups is not the 
same. In addition, F-statistic of 2.328 is greater than the F-critical value and therefore the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the F-statistic is deemed statistically significant at 0.05. It can 
therefore be inferred that implementation of the new trading engine in July 2012 did impact 
the average yearly turnover ratio between each July-to-July year group and therefore 
impacted liquidity as well.  Again, the turnover ratio looks at how frequently the number of 
shares per stock is traded in comparison to the total number of shares available.  One could 
perhaps indirectly argue that the introduction of the trading engine and its technology allowed 
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market participants easier and quicker access and exit to/from the market – bringing with it 
higher trade volumes and therefore greater liquidity. 
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Figure 6: Average Yearly Turnover Ratio per Ordinary Share (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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 Figure 7: Average Daily Turnover Ratio (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 8: Average Turnover Ratio (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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7.1.1.3 Average Daily Value Traded 
Though difficult to deduce any particular trend, the JSE Equity Market’s average daily value 
from 2 July 2005 - 1 July 2007 increased by roughly 26% and then again by another 41% in 
the following year. The subsequent July-to-July years showed decreased average daily value 
traded and only started seeing an increase in average value traded from 2 July 2011 - 1 July 
2013. 
Figure 9 shows the average daily value traded per ordinary share during the data sample 
period. It is evident when examining the entire sample period that there does not appear to be 
an increased number of different securities that now have amplified average daily value 
traded figures. Instead, it appears to be the same securities that are traded from 2 July 2005 - 
1 July 2013, in just higher average daily values. These include the likes of Anglo American 
(AGL), BHP Billiton (BIL), MTN, SABMiller (SAB) and Sasol (SOL) as indicated by the 
red circles. Noticeably, these instruments are not the same outliers when the ILLIQ ratio and 
the turnover ratio were examined. Instead, these instruments are the most liquid shares on the 
JSE, which have high value traded figures and large market capitalisation figures. 
Figure 10, shows the time series view for the daily value traded during the data sample 
period. The daily value traded during this data sample period seemed particularly heightened 
during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 and then again from 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 (shown in the 
red circles). In particular, the 22-day moving average for the latter period seems to suggest an 
upward trend. This is interesting; as it is particularly during these aforementioned periods that 
the JSE implemented new trading engine technology. Figure 11 shows the average daily 
value traded for each July-on-July period with two peaks in particular, namely during 2 July 
2007 - 1 July 2008 and then again from 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 (shown in the red circles). 
The standard deviation of the average daily value traded, in Table 7, appears much greater 
during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 and then again during 2 July 2011 - 1 July 2013. This 
appears to agree with the observed volatility in Figure 10. The averages shown in Table 7 for 
each July-to-July year group also vary greatly, with only some groups showing similar 
average figures. 
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Table 7: Summary Results for Average Daily Value Traded 
Groups Count Sum Average Standard Deviation 
2 July 2005 - 1 July 2006 91 R 5 461 235 362 R 60 013 575 R 116 479 424  
2 July 2006 - 1 July 2007 91 R 6 905 068 897 R 75 879 878 R 149 412 810  
2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 91 R 9 736 370 059   R 106 993 078 R 220 029 362  
2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009 91 R 8 625 586 118 R 94 786 661 R 198 193 797  
2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010 91 R 8 517 416 342 R 93 597 982 R 190 179 383  
2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011 91 R 8 549 775 722 R 93 953 579 R 193 405 086  
2 July 2011 - 1 July 2012 91 R 9 425 985 044   R 103 582 253 R 217 221 306  
2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 91   R 10 236 759 904   R 112 491 867 R 204 340 792  
 
Again, following the same approach with the ILLIQ ratio and the turnover ratio, a one-way 
ANOVA exercise is done for average daily value traded. The results of this exercise in Table 
8 show how the average daily value traded are either different or the same from one July-to-
July year group to the next. The same null hypothesis is used, namely that the average daily 
value traded for each July-to-July year is the same, thus implying that the trading engine 
upgrade has had no significant impact on the average daily value traded between each July-
to-July group.  
 
Table 8: ANOVA Results for Average Daily Value Traded 
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between 
Groups 
188 595 044 107 837 000 7 26 942 149 158 262 500 0.753 0.627 2.022 
Within 
Groups 
25 748 939 244 364 500 000 720 35 762 415 617 172 900 
   
       
Total 25 937 534 288 472 300 000 727 
    
 
The p-value (0.627) in the results Table 8, show that it is greater than 0.05 and therefore we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis where the p-value is not statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. It can therefore be deemed that the average daily value traded between the July-to-July 
groups is the same. In addition, the F-statistic of 0.753 is less than the F-critical value and 
again we fail to reject the null hypothesis where F-statistic is not deemed statistically 
significant at 0.05. It can therefore be expressed that the evidence at hand shows that the 
implementation of the new trading engine in July 2012 did not impact the average daily value 
traded between each July-to-July year group and therefore liquidity was not affected either. 
The ANOVA results for average daily value traded are in line with the ANOVA results of the 
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ILLIQ ratio.  It could therefore be inferred that the average daily value traded during the 
trading engine implementation period was perhaps due to increased share prices, as a result of 
market demand and supply forces.  Liquidity therefore remained fairly uninfluenced by the 
trading engine upgrade. 
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Figure 9: Average Daily Value Traded per Ordinary Share (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 10: Daily Value Traded (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
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Figure 11: Average Daily Value Traded for each July-on-July Period (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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7.1.1.4 Average Market Capitalisation 
It is predominately the small-cap companies, such as ADW, Basil Read Holdings (BSR) and 
VIL (shown in red circles) that showed the biggest average market capitalisation growth 
during the data sample period, as seen in Figure 12. The growth in average market 
capitalisation for the remaining stocks within this data sample for the same data period 
appeared relatively flat in comparison. These excessive growth (and decline) figures for the 
aforementioned three stocks, though seemingly extreme, are based on small market 
capitalisation figures and therefore when compared with the likes SABMiller (SAB), BIL and 
AGL appear as large changes. The same would apply for decreases in small market 
capitalisation companies as well. As an example, ADW average market capitalisation as at 1 
July 2009 and 1 July 2010 had diminished by 79% and 80%, respectively.   
Figure 13 shows that the blue chip companies, such as SAB, BIL and AGL showed the most 
notable increase in average market capitalisation in terms of absolute figures. When 
comparing 2 July 2005 - 1 July 2006 to 2 July 2006 - 1 July 2007, the average market 
capitalisation of AGL and BIL increased by approximately R210 billion and R100 billion 
each, respectively. However, during the onset of the GFC, each of these companies saw their 
average market capitalisation diminish by R410 billion and R240 billion each, when 
comparing 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 to 2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009. SAB also saw a large leap 
in its market capitalisation during 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2011, when it rose by roughly R217 
billion compared to the previous July-to-July year. 
Figure 14 examines the average daily market capitalisation for the data sample. The overall 
trend is increasing, but Figure 14 shows that a dip was evident from May 2008 to May 2010, 
which overlapped the GFC period. These average market capitalisation figures only really 
started picking up in 2012 and have continued their increasing trend throughout 2013, as seen 
in Figure 14 and Figure 15 which examine the average annual market capitalisation for the 
data sample. 
The standard deviation of the average annual market capitalisation, in Table 9, appears much 
greater during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 and then again during 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013. The 
averages shown in Table 9 for each July-to-July year group also vary greatly, with only some 
groups showing similar average figures. 
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Table 9: Summary Results for Average Annual Market Capitalisation 
Groups Count Sum Average Standard Deviation 
2 July 2005 - 
1 July 2006 
91 R 2 270 575 707 401 R 24 951 381 400 R 51 541 750 967 
2 July 2006 - 
1 July 2007 
91 R 3 165 773 477 620 R 34 788 719 534 R 76 786 962 163 
2 July 2007 - 
1 July 2008 
91 R 3 770 018 129 284 R 41 428 770 651 R 98 767 381 151 
2 July 2008 - 
1 July 2009 
91 R 2 800 900 610 276 R 30 779 127 585 R 68 713 124 406 
2 July 2009 - 
1 July 2010 
91 R 3 304 209 149 261 R 36 309 990 651 R 80 562 979 510 
2 July 2010 - 
1 July 2011 
91 R 3 747 436 555 956 R 41 180 621 494 R 90 561 010 578 
2 July 2011 - 
1 July 2012 
91 R 3 915 963 385 356 R 43 032 564 674 R 91 557 284 117 
2 July 2012 - 
1 July 2013 
91 R 4 495 053 515 030 R 49 396 192 473 R 108 305 255 674 
 
A one-way ANOVA exercise is again done for average annual market capitalisation. The 
same null hypothesis is applicable, namely that the average annual market capitalisation for 
each July-to-July year is the same. Thus, the suggestion is that the trading engine upgrade has 
had little effect on the average annual market capitalisation between each July-to-July group.  
 
Table 10: ANOVA Results for Average Annual Market Capitalisation 
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F 
P-
value 
F 
crit 
Between 
Groups 
37 499 290 584 389 900 000 000 7 5 357 041 512 055 700 000 000 0.741 0.647 2.022 
Within 
Groups 
5 205 036 031 382 740 000 000 000 720 7 229 216 710 253 810 000 000 
   
 
      
Total 5 242 535 321 967 130 000 000 000 727 
    
 
The p-value (0.647) in the results Table 10 is greater than 0.05 and hence we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis as the p-value is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It can therefore 
be suggested that the average annual market capitalisation between the July-to-July groups is 
identical. The F-statistic of 0.741 is less than the F-critical value, thus we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis as the F-statistic is not deemed statistically significant at 0.05. With the 
evidence at hand, it can therefore be expressed that the implementation of the new trading 
engine in July 2012 did not influence the average annual market capitalisation between each 
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July-to-July year group and therefore did not influence liquidity either. Again, similarly to the 
ANOVA results for the ILLIQ ratio and average daily value traded, the ANOVA results for 
average market capitalisation seem to also infer that the share price increases was not because 
of the trading engine – but rather due to natural market forces of demand and supply.  
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Figure 12: YOY Average Market Capitalisation Growth per Ordinary Share (2 July 2007 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 13: Average Market Capitalisation (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 14: Daily Market Capitalisation (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
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Figure 15: Average Market Capitalisation for each July-on-July Period (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
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7.1.1.5 Average Spread 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations the average spread data is only available from April 
2007 and therefore creates a slight challenge regarding the comparison of the various 
liquidity measurements during the same data sample period. The average spread formula is 
shown in Equation 2 below. 
Equation 2:  Average Spread 
 
               
∑                   
 
 
               
∑                               
∑                   
 
 SumOfBidPrice 
o Sum of the price of the best bid updates on the statistic date. 
 SumOfOfferPrice 
o Sum of the price of the best offer updates on the statistic date. 
 CountOfTotalUpdates 
o Count of the best bid and best offer updates on the statistic date. 
Figure 16 shows how the year-on-year growth of the annual average spread has changed 
during the data sample period. Super Group Ltd (SPG) (shown in the red circle) seems to 
show the most erratic year-on-year growth of a company’s annual average spread. Its annual 
average spread decreased by 84% during 2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010, increased by 319% 
during 2 July 2011 - 1 July 2012 and then finally by 115% during 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013.  
Liberty Holdings (LBH) (shown in the red circle) was another ordinary share that showed a 
spike with regard to its year-on-year growth of its annual average spread. Both of these shares 
fall within the ZA02 trading segment and therefore typically have medium levels of liquidity. 
Figure 17 shows the annual average spread per ordinary share within the data sample from 2 
July 2007 -1 July 2013. When considering the annual average spread in absolute terms, 
Figure 17 shows that Liberty Ltd Group (LBH) and Palamin Palabora Mining Company Ltd 
(PAM) (shown in red circles) show the largest annual average spreads, particularly during 2 
July 2008 - 1 July 2009. LBH is a ZA02 share as is PAM. It is, however, noticeable that 
PAM’s annual average spread decreases significantly, starting from 2 July 2008 - 1 July 
2009.  
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Figure 18 illustrates the daily average spread for the entire data sample. The red circle shows 
how erratic daily average spreads were during the period that overlapped the GFC, namely 
July 2008 - January 2009. The daily average spread started to narrow following this volatile 
period, evident by the much smoother 22-day moving average trend that followed. 
During 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008, the annual average spread for the entire data sample was at 
roughly 60 cents (in the red circle) and decreased steadily over the data sample period to 
roughly 30 cents (in red circled) as can be seen in Figure 19. The volatility around the annual 
average spread also diminished significantly since the 2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009 period, 
shown in Table 11. It would appear that especially during the GFC, the annual average spread 
and volatility were at their highest levels, as can be expected during periods of significant 
instability and uncertainty. 
Table 11: Standard Deviation of Annual Average Spread (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
 
2 July 
2007 
- 
1 July 
2008 
2 July 
2008 
- 
1 July 
2009 
2 July 
2009 
- 
1 July 
2010 
2 July 
2010 
- 
1 July 
2011 
2 July 
2011 
- 
1 July 
2012 
2 July 
2012 
- 
1 July 
2013 
Standard 
Deviation 
72.646 122.260 53.838 32.993 27.980 29.039 
 
The averages shown in Table 12 for each July-to-July year group are particularly similar from 
2 July 2010 - 1 July 2013, as are the standard deviation figures. 
 
Table 12: Summary Results of Annual Average Spread 
Groups Count Sum Average Standard Deviation 
2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 91 5206.794 57.218 72.646 
2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009 91 5870.675 64.513 122.260 
2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010 91 3736.059 41.056 53.838 
2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011 91 2958.543 32.511 32.993 
2 July 2011 - 1 July 2012 91 2844.200 31.255 27.980 
2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 90 2954.118 32.824 29.039 
 
In completing a one-way ANOVA exercise for the annual average spreads for the data 
sample, it is possible to discern how similar or dissimilar the July-to-July groups are. The null 
hypothesis, namely that the annual average spread for each July-to-July year is the same, is 
again applicable.  The same premise is applicable, namely that the trading engine upgrade has 
had little effect on the annual average spread between each July-to-July group.  
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Table 13: ANOVA Results for Annual Average Spread 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 92 704.653 5 18 540.931 4.299 0.001 2.231 
Within Groups 2 324 595.174 539 4 312.793 
   
 
      Total 2 417 299.827 544 
     
The p-value (0.001) in the results Table 13 is less than 0.05 and hence we can reject the null 
hypothesis as the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This would suggest that 
the annual average spread between the July-to-July groups is not identical. The F-statistic of 
4.299 is much greater than the F-critical value, thus we reject the null hypothesis as the F-
statistic is deemed statistically significant at 0.05. With the evidence at hand it can therefore 
be inferred that the implementation of the new trading engine in July 2012 could have 
influenced the annual average spread between each July-to-July year group and therefore 
liquidity as well. A reason for this could be that even if the best bid or best offer prices 
remained fairly subdued, the influx of the number of best bid/offers was significant (again 
one could argue because the technology allowed quicker access and exit to/from the market 
place) and therefore lowered the annual average spread and improved liquidity. 
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Figure 16: YOY Growth of Annual Average Spread per Ordinary Share (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 17: Annual Average Spread per Ordinary Share (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 18: Daily Average Spread (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 19: Annual Average Spread (2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013)
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7.1.1.6 JSE Liquidity Measurement 
The last liquidity measurement is one calculated by the JSE and represents annualised 
liquidity of the JSE central order book (COB) and ignores reported trades (off-order book 
trades), warrants and other investment products. It follows the WFE’s turnover velocity 
formula shown below in Equation 3. 
Equation 3: JSE Liquidity Measurement 
 
JSE Liquidity Measurement   =                                        
                                        Month-end Domestic Market Capitalisation 
         
 
Due to some data discrepancies, the JSE liquidity measurement data for the period 2 July 
2005 - 1 July 2006 was removed. Figure 20 shows that Imperial Holdings Limited (IPL) 
during 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008, Telkom SA Limited (TKG) during 2 July 2008 - 1 July 
2009 and ADW during 2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010, were the biggest outliers in terms of the 
JSE’s liquidity measurement. Neither of these companies falls within the same trading 
segment as ADW is a ZA03 stock: TKG is a ZA02 stock and IPL forms part of the Top 40 
stocks listed on the JSE. Thus, they do not share the same characteristics in terms of value 
traded, average spread or market capitalisation. 
Figure 21 also shows that there has been a general decline in the annualised JSE liquidity 
measurement since 2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 which then only really picked up from 2 July 
2012 - 1 July 2013, the period in which the trading engine upgrade occurred. 
The standard deviation of the annualised JSE liquidity measurement, in Table 14, appears 
rather large during 2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010, synonymous with the volatility experienced 
during the GFC period.  
Table 14: Summary Results of Annualised JSE Liquidity Measurement 
Groups Count Sum Average Standard Deviation 
2 July 2006 - 1 July 2007 91 33.411 0.367 0.224 
2 July 2007 - 1 July 2008 91 56.526 0.621 0.423 
2 July 2008 - 1 July 2009 91 49.439 0.543 0.400 
2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010 91 46.343 0.509 0.591 
2 July 2010 - 1 July 2011 91 35.395 0.389 0.246 
2 July 2011 - 1 July 2012 91 33.908 0.373 0.229 
2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 91 40.029 0.440 0.360 
*12 
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The one-way ANOVA exercise for the annualised JSE liquidity measurement for the data 
sample attempts to determine how alike or different the July-to-July groups are, regarding the 
average figures. Applying the same null hypothesis, that is, annualised JSE liquidity 
measurement for each July-to-July year is alike, is again relevant.  
 
Table 15: ANOVA Results for Annualised JSE Liquidity Measurement 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 5.185 6 0.864 6.167 0.000003 2.113 
Within Groups 88.280 630 0.140 
   
 
      Total 93.465 636 
     
The p-value (0.000003) in the results Table 15 is less than 0.05 and hence we can reject the 
null hypothesis as the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This would suggest 
that the annualised JSE liquidity measurements between the July-to-July groups are not the 
same. The F-statistic of 6.167 is also much greater than the F-critical value, thus we can again 
reject the null hypothesis as the F-statistic is deemed statistically significant at 0.05. The 
results suggest that the introduction of the new trading engine in July 2012 could have 
affected the annualised JSE liquidity measurement each July-to-July year group and therefore 
liquidity as well.  It would appear that once again, another volume based liquidity 
measurement responded positively to the introduction of the new trading engine.  It can 
perhaps indirectly be inferred that improved technology has allowed much greater activity 
within the market, through the higher frequency that shares are being traded. 
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Figure 20: Annualised JSE Liquidity Measurement per Ordinary Share (2 July 2006 - 1 July 2013)
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Figure 21: Annualised JSE Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2006 - 1 July 2013)
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7.1.2 Correlations of Liquidity Measurement Rankings 
The second part of the analysis examines to what degree these aforementioned liquidity 
measurements are correlated with each other in terms of each instrument’s liquidity ranking. 
Tables A to H in the appendices highlight how each instrument within the data sample 
ranked for each liquidity measurement where one equated to being the most liquid and 91, 
the least liquid. Because the ILLIQ ratio indicates illiquidity, a ranking of one indicates that 
the instrument is the least illiquid and therefore the most liquid. Table 16 below highlights 
the most liquid instruments per liquidity measurement for the entire data sample period.  
AGL and BIL appear to be the most liquid instruments as they are the most prevalent across 
most of the different liquidity measurements. What is significant is that these same 
instruments do not have the narrowest spread or the highest turnover ratios. The only 
liquidity measurements which appear to deliver roughly the same rankings include the ILLIQ 
ratio, average daily value traded and average market capitalisation. 
Table 16: Most Liquid Instruments Based on Liquidity Measurement Rankings                       
(2 July 2005 - 1 July 2013) 
 
2 July 
2005 
 - 
1 July 
2006 
2 July 
2006 
 - 
1 July 
2007 
2 July 
2007 
 - 
 1 July 
2008 
2 July 
2008 
 -  
1 July 
2009 
2 July 
2009 
 -  
1 July 
2010 
2 July 
2010 
 - 
 1 July 
2011 
2 July 
2011 
 -  
1 July 
2012 
2 July 
2012 
 -  
1 July 
2013 
ILLIQ Ratio AGL AGL AGL MTN ASA AGL AGL SBK 
Turnover 
Ratio 
LEW MSM TRU MUR AEG MUR MPC ABL 
Average 
Spread 
N/A N/A MRF MRF MRF SPG ADW ADW 
Average 
Daily Value 
Traded 
AGL AGL AGL AGL AGL AGL AGL MTN 
Average 
Market Cap 
AGL AGL AGL BIL BIL BIL BIL SAB 
JSE 
Liquidity 
Measurement 
JSE GFI IPL TKG ADW MUR ABL ABL 
ASA – Absa Group Ltd   SBK – Standard Bank Group Ltd  LEW – Lewis Group Ltd    MSM – Massmart Holdings Ltd  TRU – Truworths International    
MUR – Murray and  Roberts Holdings   AEG – Aveng Ltd   MPC – Mr Price Group   ABL – African Bank Ltd  MRF – Merafe Resources  SPG – Super Group Limited  
GFI  - Gold Fields Limited  IPL – Imperial Holdings Ltd  TKG – Telkom SA Limited 
 
The liquidity measurement rankings for the data period are correlated against each other as 
seen in Tables I to P in the appendix section. It is evident that the ILLIQ ratio, average daily 
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value traded and average market capitalisation rankings share a very strong and positive 
correlation with each other throughout the data sample period. The reason for this is perhaps 
because all three measurements involve some connection to share prices and their 
movements. 
It is expected that a negative correlation would exist between the ILLIQ ratio and the 
turnover ratio – which is the case during 2 July 2005 - 1 July 2006; however the subsequent 
periods all seem to show a positive correlation between the rankings of the ILLIQ ratio and 
the turnover ratio.    
Another significant observation is that correlation of the average spread rankings to the 
average market capitalisation rankings is negative throughout the data sample period. This 
suggests that though closing share prices might have increased the number of best bids and 
best offers were significant enough to warrant a decrease in average spread.  In addition, the 
correlation of the average daily valued traded rankings to the average spread rankings is 
largely negative, though during 2 July 2009 - 1 July 2010, the correlation was positive and 
closer to zero. 
The JSE liquidity measurement, however, shows a much wider range of the most liquid 
instruments during the data sample period. All of which differ from the most liquid 
instruments as identified by the ILLIQ ratio, average daily value traded and average market 
capitalisation. 
Naturally, all these measurements involve different variables which influence it, therefore if 
would be difficult to assume that the same instrument would be ranked as the most liquid 
instrument for each measurement under review.  If this was the case it would mean that the 
most liquid instrument, that fits this expression across all the different liquidity 
measurements, would have small share price returns (ILLIQ ratio), large volumes of its 
shares being traded relative to the shares available (turnover ratio), have small average 
spreads, large average daily value traded amounts and either have a large market cap because 
of a large share price increase or an increased number of shares in issue.  Again, as Liu 
(2006) stated, liquidity is multidimensional and a great deal more complex than one would 
suppose. 
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7.1.3 Portfolio Event Study  
The third part of the data analysis includes a portfolio event study to ascertain whether or not 
the introduction of the new trading engine (the event) on 2 July 2012 resulted in abnormal 
returns which were statistically significant. These abnormal returns, as a result of changes in 
closing prices, would naturally impact the calculation of market capitalisation. Thus, in 
determining whether market capitalisation (a liquidity measurement) increase during the 
trading engine upgrade was statistically significant, one could deduce that the trading engine 
upgrade did indeed affect liquidity. 
The data sample period is dissected into three key time frames: 
a) The estimation window (control period): 1 July 2011 - 28 June 2012 
b) The event window: 29 June 2012 - 3 July 2012 
c) The post-event window: 4 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 
The data sample is also broken up into three key portfolios, each consisting of either ZA01 
stocks, ZA02 or ZA03 stocks. ZA01 consists of the Top 40 stocks listed on the JSE and are 
also seen as the most liquid. ZA02 and ZA03 stocks have medium and low liquidity levels, 
respectively. 
Using a regression of each of these portfolios’ average daily returns to the market index (All 
Share), during the estimation window, it is possible to measure the impact of the event on 
each of the aforementioned portfolios’ returns in the event window.  The market model 
portfolio is shown as follows: 
Equation 4: Portfolio’s Return 
rit = αi + βirMt 
rit and rMt represent the portfolios’ return and the All Share return on a daily basis, 
respectively.  The intercept αi and slope βi are determined by running an OLS regression 
during the estimation window (Benninga, 2008). The abnormal return is calculated by 
deducting each portfolio’s daily expected return from its actual return, during the event 
window. The abnormal return serves as a means of determining what impact the event (in 
this case, the trading engine upgrade) had on the market value of each of the portfolios 
(Benninga, 2008) and therefore its liquidity. 
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The test statistic for the daily abnormal return for each portfolio is calculated by dividing the 
average daily abnormal return of each portfolio by the standard error (Benninga, 2008). In 
assuming that the regression residuals are normally distributed, when the absolute value of 
the test statistic is greater than 1.96, one can ascertain that each portfolio’s average daily 
abnormal return is statistically significant at the 95% level. 
a) ZA01 Portfolio 
Table 17: ZA01 Portfolio Estimation Window Output 
Estimation Window 
Intercept 0.0100181 
Slope  27.691417 
R Squared 0.9400788 
Standard Error 0.0766359 
 
The R-squared shows that 94% of this portfolio’s returns can be explained by the All Share 
Index. The slope is much greater than one, indicating that this portfolio’s returns are a great 
deal more volatile than the market’s returns. 
 
Table 18: ZA01 Portfolio Estimation Event Window Output 
Event Window 
Date 
Actual 
Return 
Expected 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return Test 
Statistically 
Significant 
All 
Share 
Return 
2012/06/29 34.22% 38.96% -4.73% -4.73% -0.62 No 1.37% 
2012/07/02 -6.79% -3.57% -3.22% -7.95% -0.42 No -0.17% 
2012/07/03 32.49% 28.40% 4.08% -3.87% 0.53 No 0.99% 
 
On the day of the new trading engine implementation, the actual returns of portfolio ZA01 
decreased with 6.79% and the market saw a drop of 0.17%. The abnormal returns of portfolio 
ZA01, based on the abnormal return test, during the event window are, however, not 
statistically significant, it cannot be conclusively interpreted that the trading engine 
implementation had an impact on the liquidity of portfolio ZA01.  It could be inferred, that 
because ZA01 includes the most liquid stocks on the JSE already, their share price 
movements would not be significant seeing as their share prices are regularly updated in the 
market and do not reflect stale share price information. 
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b) ZA02 Portfolio 
Table 19: ZA02 Portfolio Estimation Window Output 
Estimation Window 
Intercept 0.0467798 
Slope 17.787882 
R Squared 0.0974895 
Standard Error 0.5932678 
 
Table 20: ZA02 Portfolio Event Window Output 
Event Window 
Date 
Actual 
Return 
Expected 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return Test 
Statistically 
Significant 
All 
Share 
Return 
2012/06/29 47.78% 29.06% 18.73% 18.73% 0.32 No 1.37% 
2012/07/02 -141.55% 1.74% -143.30% -124.57% -2.42 Yes -0.17% 
2012/07/03 29.85% 22.28% 7.57% -117.00% 0.13 No 0.99% 
 
Similarly, the ZA02 portfolio’s abnormal returns were not statistically significant during the 
event window, with the exception of the day that the trading engine upgrade occurred. 
Abnormal returns for this portfolio decreased by 143.30% and the absolute abnormal return 
test was greater than 1.96, suggesting that the trading engine upgrade could have had a 
meaningful impact on liquidity. This trading segment holds medium liquid instruments, 
suggesting that a change in share prices might be meaningful as these share prices are not 
regularly updated and can therefore initially reflect stale share price information.  
c) ZA03 Portfolio 
Table 21: ZA03 Portfolio Estimation Window Output 
Estimation Window 
Intercept 0.0086789 
Slope 2.5713675 
R Squared 0.0401902 
Standard Error 0.1377449 
 
ZA03 portfolio abnormal returns were not statistically significant during the event window. 
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Table 22: ZA03 Portfolio Event Window Output 
Event Window 
Date 
Actual 
Return 
Expected 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return Test 
Statistically 
Significant 
All 
Share 
Return 
2012/06/29 -6.25% 0.01% -6.26% -6.26% -0.77 No 1.37% 
2012/07/02 0.00% 0.51% -0.51% -6.77% -0.06 No -0.17% 
2012/07/03 6.67% 0.13% 6.53% -0.24% 0.80 No 0.99% 
 
In summary, neither of the portfolios showed abnormal returns that were statistically 
significant, with the exception of the ZA02 portfolio on the trading engine upgrade date. In 
general it seems to suggests that the implementation of the trading engine did not have an 
impact on the aforementioned portfolio’s returns and thereby their liquidity levels. Some 
possible reasons for this include that market participants are particularly inelastic to 
technological changes as every day is considered “business as usual”. Considering the event 
window at hand and the short time period, one can believe that the influence of the trading 
engine upgrade cannot be observed immediately within the short term. Instead, one has to 
perhaps believe that it is because of market participants’ behavioural changes accompanied 
with superior technology that one can only truly observe the influence over a much longer 
time frame. The reason for this is that according to industry opinion, “pure” HFT has hardly 
featured in the South African market. One of the arguments for this is that, HFT players, 
being “players of speed” require their positions to be hedged instantly. This means that the 
spot market and its derivative market should have little to no latency between them. 
Currently, that is not the case in the JSE. It can be argued that only once the two markets are 
on par with each other’s latency levels, will there be a long-term effect on liquidity because 
of HFT activity. 
Market participants’ behavioural changes include adopting different trading strategies, such 
as algorithmic trading or forms of low latency trading. Depending on the trading technology 
at hand, it can foster or discourage certain trading strategies. As mentioned, the JSE’s 
introduction of improved trading technology would deliver a low latency advantage to market 
participants and with that attract HFT activity which would encourage trading volumes 
(Corporate Communications Consultants, 2011).   
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7.1.4 JSE “Computer Trading” and Liquidity 
The fourth part of the analysis examines how increased orders, because of the advanced 
trading technology and because of new trading strategies (low latency trading and 
algorithmic trading), have impacted trading volumes and liquidity on the JSE Equity Market. 
Although difficult to prove, one has to concede, given the evidence provided by Brogaard 
(2010), that there might indeed be some logic to this reasoning.  
Unfortunately, due to data limitations it is difficult for the JSE to ascertain which of the 
trading activity is low latency trading and which is algorithmic trading.  Therefore, a number 
of key assumptions were made based on the orders data which helped to isolate “computer 
trading” which encompasses low latency trading and algorithmic trading. The key 
assumption is that a trader is perceived to be a low latency/algorithmic trader if they have 
submitted approximately 5000 orders per day (roughly 100 000 orders per month) and if the 
word “algo” formed part of the trader’s TraderID. The trades, value traded, volume traded 
and total amount of orders (total per-trade activity) which includes deleted and amended 
orders, were examined. 
Again, due to the data limitations at hand, it was only possible to extract data from April 
2007. But for comparative purposes, the data period for this data sample is from July 2007 - 1 
July 2013. 
Figure 22 compares the total volume traded (or shares traded) and the total number of orders 
related to the JSE’s “computer trading”. It is worthwhile noting that during 2007 to roughly 
mid-2009, the correlation between total volume traded and total number of orders for 
“computer trading”, was fairly aligned. However, the total number of “computer trading” 
orders increased steeply from 2010, yet the total volume traded slumped and remained 
relatively flat until July 2012.  From July 2012 to July 2013, total volume traded started to 
see an uptake, once again subsequent to the trading engine upgrade. 
 Figure 23 examines the total “computer trading” orders versus the total “computer trading” 
trades, which appear to show a positive correlation between the these two elements. Since 
end June 2011, the number of “computer trading” orders has increased considerably, as can 
be seen in Figure 23 on the next page. Notable heights were reached in total “computer 
trading” orders and trades during July 2012 to June 2013. 
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Figure 22: Total Volume Traded vs. Total Computer Trading Orders (July 2007 - July 2013) 
 
Figure 23:  Total Trades vs. Total Computer Trading Orders (July 2007 - July 2013) 
 
When comparing total “computer trading” orders with total “computer trading” value traded, 
there is again a very close correlation between the two variables, shown in Figure 24.    
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Figure 24: Total Value Traded vs. Total Computer Trading Orders (July 2007 - July 2013)
 
 
Overall, “computer trading” trades, value, volume and orders all increased since July 2007, 
with a notable peak during the period 1 July 2012 to end June 2013 when the second trading 
engine upgrade occurred. 
 
In comparing this type of trading activity with all central order book activity, in Figure 25, it 
would appear that “computer trading” has seen an increasing trend, particularly from July 
2011 to June 2013.  
 
However, what do these variables say about liquidity and especially about the suggested 
positive relationship between the JSE’s “computer trading”, the trading engine upgrade and 
liquidity? Based on the research on hand, HFTs, or low latency traders would typically only 
trade instruments that already have high levels of liquidity so as to allow for the ease of 
entrance and exit from the market. This data sample includes 91 JSE listed instruments, with 
the Top 40 again representing the largest companies based on market capitalisation but which 
are also the most liquid shares listed on the exchange.  
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Figure 25: Computer Trading as Percentage of Central Order Book Trading                      
(July 2007 - July 2013)
 
Bearing this in mind, the danger exists that because the Top 40 shares make up a significant 
proportion of the total JSE trading activity, the results might be one-sided as it might indicate 
that very liquid instruments have now become more liquid but that the less liquid 
instruments’ liquidity has not seen much improvement. To support this, a study by 
Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) examines the empirical relationship or connection 
between AT and liquidity. The authors use NYSE electronic message traffic (or orders), as a 
proxy for AT and find that as AT increases, so too does liquidity improve. Their findings 
show particularly that AT encourages liquidity especially for large-cap shares, as quote and 
effective spreads become narrower. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) also find that 
AT did not only decrease adverse selection but also lowered the cost of trading and increased 
how informative quotes are.  
 
The liquidity measurements that showed changes in liquidity that were statistical significant 
following the trading engine upgrade, namely the turnover ratio, average spread and the 
JSE’s liquidity measurement, were compared with “computer trading” activity. Figure 26 on 
the following page shows that as total “computer trading” orders increased, the average 
turnover ratio decreased and only started picking up again from July 2012 to June 2013, 
during the trading engine upgrade.  One could then perhaps indirectly suggest that as market 
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conditions improved following the GFC and the trading engine upgrade in 2012, more shares 
were being traded (more transactions) as the increase in number of orders meant that there 
was a perceived increase in demand to buy and sell. 
 
Figure 26: Average Turnover Ratio vs. Total Computer Trading Orders (July 2007-July2013)
 
Figure 27: Annual Average Spread vs. Total Computer Trading Orders (July 2007- July2013)
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When comparing the annual average spread to total “computer trading” orders (Figure 27), 
the annual average spread decreased significantly from July 2008 and then started to even out 
from July 2010 onwards. It can perhaps be inferred that the large inflow of best bid and best 
orders, because of “computer trading” had decreased the spread and therefore improved 
liquidity.  
Figure 28: Average Annualised JSE Liquidity Measurement vs. Computer Trading Orders 
(July 2007 - July 2013)
 
According to Figure 28, liquidity within the JSE Equity Market decreased significantly from 
July 2007 until June 2012, and only from July 2012 did liquidity appear to increase again. 
During the same time “computer trading” orders started to increase gradually, as did 
“computer trading” trades and volume shown in Figure 25. 
7.1.5 Summary of Analysis 
The results of the various parts of the analysis are summarised as follows:  
a) Liquidity Measurements Compared 
Each of the liquidity measurements examined initially seemed to suggest that liquidity 
improved particularly during the 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 period.  However, once ANOVA 
exercises were conducted for each measurement to ascertain whether the influence of the 
trading engine on liquidity was statistically significant, the results were less conclusive.  
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Table 23 summarises the outcome ANOVA exercises for each liquidity measurement: 
Table 23: Summary of ANOVA Results for each Liquidity Measurement 
Liquidity Measurement Statistically Significant 
ILLIQ Ratio No 
Turnover Ratio Yes 
Average Spread Yes 
Average Daily Value Traded No 
Average Market Capitalisation No 
JSE Liquidity Measurement Yes 
 
The shortcoming of the ANOVA exercise was that it was not possible to conclusively deduce 
the influence of the trading engine on liquidity for a particular July-on-July year group, that 
is, 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013.  Rather, reliance was placed on the inferences. 
The ANOVA results for the ILLIQ ratio, average daily value traded and average market 
capitalisation – whose liquidity formulas are all connected to share price seemed to suggest 
that share price movements, due to demand and supply, and were not significant enough to 
suggest the influence of other external forces, such as a trading engine upgrade in this case. 
The ANOVA results for the turnover ratio, average spread and the JSE’s liquidity 
measurement all seemed to infer that an increase in volume/orders, brought on by the easier 
and quicker access that the trading engine was affording market participants, affected 
liquidity significantly. One could infer that the trading engine introduced low latency trading, 
encouraged order flow and therefore influenced liquidity positively.  As previously 
mentioned when Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) had examined whether the 
increased AT improved market liquidity the authors found that the spreads of large NYSE 
stocks narrowed and that both adverse selection and trade-related price discovery reduced 
because of AT.  Authors, Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) also stated that speed is vitally 
important to traders as it allows for the ultimate desire to create profitable opportunities by 
being the “quickest to market” i.e. low latency trading.  The result has been that market 
players are continuously searching for state-of-the-art technology that would afford 
immediate access to the market place. 
 
. 
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b) Correlations of Liquidity Measurement Rankings 
The second part of the analysis offered some insight into how different the outcomes of each 
of the liquidity measurements rankings were. Characteristics such as narrow spreads, large 
market capitalisation and high average daily value traded were not always synonymous with 
liquidity. 
This is reinforced by the notion of how complex liquidity really is, as Liu (2006) and.  
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) had emphasised. 
c) Portfolio Event Study 
The third part of the analysis, following the realisation that liquidity measurements offered 
varying results in terms of liquidity and that the ANOVA exercise offered inconclusive 
results, was to determine whether the impact of the trading engine on liquidity (portfolio 
returns), through a portfolio event study, was statistically significant. 
Although the returns of the ZA02 portfolio seemed to suggest that the trading engine upgrade 
did impact liquidity for this portfolio, overall the event study did not seem to share the same 
results for the ZA01 and ZA03 portfolios. 
As expressed previously, the results could be explained because of market participants’ 
immunity to technological changes. It is the actual market participant behaviour due to 
factors such as regulatory changes in markets, billing methodologies, clearing models and 
trading strategies that actually influence liquidity. Technology is just a means to access a 
market and instead it is the actual market behaviour that brings the technology to its full 
potential. As mentioned, the JSE Equity Market and JSE Equity Derivative Market does not 
share the same latency levels – as each of these markets use different trading technology and 
thus sit on different platforms as well. This disparity means that ‘pure’ HFT players will not 
seek to ‘play’ in this market as they cannot hedge their positions instantly.  
d)  JSE Computer Trading 
Off the cuff it would appear that the trading engine upgrade which has encouraged increased 
“computer trading” orders have also led to an increase in liquidity, because of increased 
trading and volumes. All the elements such as increased market capitalisation, narrowed 
spreads, increased trading activity particularly during the 2 July 2012 - 1 July 2013 period 
seem to suggest that there is indeed a positive relationship.  However, the results are not 
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conclusive or statistically significant enough to prove an exact connection.  Instead reliance is 
placed on the indirect associations and what the results infer. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
 
The JSE Equity Market has evolved dramatically from an informal market conducted 
between chains 126 years ago, to a formidable force in being recognised as the most well 
regulated exchange in the world to sporting the ability for participants to execute in the JSE 
Equity Market central order book at speeds almost 400 times faster than the previous trading 
engine. 
Growth in trading activity following each trading engine upgrade in the JSE Equity Market 
has been quite evident. The microstructure changes, such as low latency trading that came 
about because of the technological enhancement and the plethora of academic research 
concerning high speed trading and liquidity, posed the question as to whether there was a 
trend regarding the exchange’s liquidity. It also posed the question as to whether all liquidity 
was the same and whether it truly was as multidimensional as some authors had suggested. 
In examining a number of different liquidity measurements to ascertain whether there was 
indeed a positive change in liquidity following the trading engine upgrade, it appeared 
initially that there was indeed an influence. However, once ANOVA exercises were 
conducted for each measurement to ascertain whether the influence of the trading engine on 
liquidity was statistically significant, the results were less conclusive. The turnover ratio, 
average spread and the JSE liquidity measurement showed positive results, whilst the ILLIQ, 
average daily value traded and average market capitalisation showed the opposite. In fact, 
half of the liquidity measurements showed results that were statistically significant, whilst the 
other half did not.  Instead reliance was made on the strength of the indirect associations and 
what the results inferred. The purpose of the ANOVA analysis is to predict a single 
independent variable (liquidity) on the basis of one or more predictor variables (in this 
instance, the trading engine upgrade).  It is difficult to control for the multiple factors that can 
affect liquidity, therefore it is suggested that for the purposes of future research a regression 
model with control variables could be considered as the regression might be better at 
inferring causality – unlike the ANOVA exercise.  In addition, a Chow Break test might also 
be worthy of conducting to ascertain any structural breaks in the data.   
In addition, the commonality between the liquidity measurements’ instrument rankings in 
terms of correlation was also weak. Characteristics such as narrow spreads, large market 
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capitalisation and high average daily value traded were not consistently synonymous with 
liquidity. 
The third part of the analysis focused on whether the impact of the trading engine on liquidity 
(portfolio returns), through a portfolio event study, was statistically significant. The results 
for portfolios ZA01 and ZA03 were not statistically significant, yet for portfolio ZA02 the 
results suggest that the trading engine did indeed have an influence on these medium liquid 
stocks. 
The last part of the analysis indicated that the trading engine upgrade which has encouraged 
“computer trading” orders, also led to an increase in liquidity. As a possible extension to the 
study, it would be prudent to again consider a regression analysis for which there is control 
for the trading engine upgrade. Possible extensions of the research include determining the 
impact of technological enhancements on the JSE Equity Derivative Market, on JSE Equity 
Market liquidity levels. Currently the JSE Equity Market and JSE Equity Derivative Market 
each use a different trading technology and a different trading platform. The result is that 
each market does not share the same latency levels of the other. This inequality means that 
for market players that are heavily reliant on high speed trading and hedging, their risk 
exposure becomes too material and they will therefore search for other markets that meet 
their needs. One trading platform that offers the same trading technology for each market 
could contribute towards the exchange’s desirability as liquid market place. 
Apart from the technological, another avenue of research could include the effect of the 
introduction of a designated market making scheme and the resultant impact on JSE Equity 
Market liquidity. In unpacking the impact of frictions on a market’s efficiency, it would also 
be useful to understand the resultant effect of the revised JSE Equity Market trading fee 
methodology on the JSE Equity Market liquidity levels, before and after the revision. 
Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) indeed believe that need for a greater universe of 
stocks, market making structures and addressing trading related costs where needed, would 
enhance liquidity. 
A final extension of the research would also include the liquidity effect of an increase in free 
float stock requirements of less liquid securities listed on the JSE Equity Market. The 
turnover ratio has shown positive results; therefore one could surmise that by making more 
tradable stock available, the effect on liquidity would be positive. 
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In summary, the results are not fully conclusive to show a positive relationship between the 
trading engine upgrade, low latency trading and liquidity. However, were market frictions 
limited or removed, the results might have been different and reflected a more liquid and 
efficient market. This said, a frictionless market is clearly not possible, the JSE Equity 
Market understands that by lessening the inhibiting factors, encouraging the development of a 
market that offers timely, cost effective and efficient execution services, liquidity will 
improve and the exchange will operate even more competitively.   
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10 APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2005 - 1 July 
2006) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average Market 
Cap 
JSE Liquidity 
ABL 28 6 23 30 8 
ADH 81 80 82 78 18 
ADR 64 38 65 74 22 
ADW 86 48 86 90 84 
AEG 32 10 31 41 19 
AFE 44 43 43 45 75 
AFX 46 82 54 37 77 
AGL 1 42 1 1 47 
ALT 53 67 55 48 70 
AMS 18 61 14 6 54 
ANG 15 45 12 9 43 
APN 25 18 26 28 11 
AQP 82 91 78 49 91 
ARI 78 75 52 40 80 
ARL 50 39 50 56 27 
ART 58 53 68 75 41 
ASA 10 34 11 11 42 
ATN 72 77 67 60 89 
AVI 37 20 39 50 37 
BAT 55 37 57 61 51 
BAW 14 7 16 21 14 
BCF 80 84 84 80 88 
BEL 88 73 76 76 81 
BIL 3 57 3 2 50 
BSR 79 36 80 84 40 
BVT 17 27 20 18 17 
CLH 57 30 58 63 66 
CML 63 64 64 62 35 
CPI 68 81 69 65 76 
DRD 62 51 56 58 65 
DSY 43 83 51 29 74 
DTC 47 31 49 57 69 
ESR 74 60 73 85 28 
FBR 65 62 72 77 52 
FSR 8 41 9 7 26 
GFI 11 5 6 13 23 
GND 39 29 40 46 58 
HAR 22 8 13 16 29 
HCI 83 90 81 54 79 
ILA 61 59 63 67 62 
ILV 45 23 42 53 53 
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INL 29 26 32 32 20 
INP 23 35 25 24 30 
IPL 16 15 17 20 15 
ISA 89 86 90 89 83 
IVT 75 76 75 70 61 
JSE 56 89 53 68 1 
LBH 48 70 47 38 68 
LEW 40 1 36 51 2 
LON 60 74 34 19 56 
MDC 41 58 45 42 72 
MPC 42 32 44 55 9 
MRF 67 65 71 72 64 
MSM 24 2 24 34 6 
MST 59 25 61 71 46 
MTN 6 12 4 8 21 
MUR 34 3 30 43 13 
NED 19 49 22 14 39 
NTC 31 44 35 27 45 
OLG 85 71 87 87 86 
OMN 54 47 60 64 57 
PAM 77 66 70 73 59 
PET 90 78 85 82 90 
PGR 69 68 66 69 48 
PIK 35 50 37 26 38 
PNC 70 40 83 83 71 
PSG 66 85 74 66 82 
PWK 51 87 62 44 73 
REM 9 24 10 12 32 
RLO 27 21 33 35 33 
RMH 30 63 29 17 49 
SAB 5 56 8 3 55 
SAP 20 4 19 25 34 
SBK 4 19 5 5 10 
SHF 21 14 21 23 4 
SHP 36 55 38 36 44 
SLM 12 16 15 15 31 
SNT 52 69 46 39 63 
SOL 2 9 2 4 24 
SOV 76 33 77 81 78 
SPG 49 46 48 52 36 
SPP 38 28 41 47 25 
SUR 73 72 79 79 67 
TBS 13 11 18 22 12 
TKG 7 17 7 10 16 
TMT 84 88 89 86 85 
TRU 33 13 27 33 3 
VIL 91 54 91 91 5 
WBO 71 52 59 59 60 
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WHL 26 22 28 31 7 
WSL 87 79 88 88 87 
 
Table B: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2006 - 1 July 
2007) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average Market 
Cap 
JSE Liquidity 
ABL 26 2 25 39 3 
ADH 79 75 81 77 77 
ADR 73 56 73 75 63 
ADW 75 24 84 86 33 
AEG 34 18 33 37 29 
AFE 41 35 41 45 37 
AFX 48 69 51 41 70 
AGL 1 49 1 1 50 
ALT 67 73 58 51 65 
AMS 10 63 7 4 61 
ANG 14 47 11 9 32 
APN 29 13 29 40 14 
AQP 71 90 65 36 90 
ARI 62 77 45 28 80 
ARL 46 37 50 58 38 
ART 57 51 69 74 53 
ASA 12 43 12 10 42 
ATN 72 85 76 61 85 
AVI 42 33 46 52 25 
BAT 52 30 54 62 27 
BAW 13 6 14 21 11 
BCF 90 78 85 83 68 
BEL 77 70 70 67 82 
BIL 3 57 3 2 57 
BSR 66 39 68 79 54 
BVT 16 25 16 18 21 
CLH 54 53 61 64 51 
CML 68 74 71 66 74 
CPI 80 88 82 68 86 
DRD 53 21 56 69 16 
DSY 56 83 52 31 81 
DTC 47 31 47 55 43 
ESR 81 50 77 81 59 
FBR 70 60 75 76 64 
FSR 8 40 9 8 39 
GFI 7 4 5 13 1 
GND 37 41 43 46 44 
HAR 17 17 15 17 15 
HCI 88 89 74 49 89 
ILA 65 58 66 72 58 
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ILV 49 54 49 50 55 
INL 33 28 31 27 19 
INP 30 45 27 20 47 
IPL 19 14 19 22 4 
ISA 86 80 88 89 75 
IVT 82 82 79 73 83 
JSE 45 8 42 59 18 
LBH 61 86 63 43 84 
LEW 36 3 37 53 2 
LON 64 87 38 14 88 
MDC 50 72 53 44 76 
MPC 39 7 39 54 9 
MRF 59 38 57 71 48 
MSM 24 1 23 38 12 
MST 89 44 72 78 35 
MTN 4 20 4 6 23 
MUR 35 16 28 32 28 
NED 22 55 22 15 46 
NTC 23 26 24 26 26 
OLG 84 79 87 88 78 
OMN 58 48 60 65 49 
PAM 63 64 67 70 73 
PET 83 84 86 82 87 
PGR 74 62 64 63 62 
PIK 32 36 35 30 34 
PNC 69 52 80 84 45 
PSG 60 61 59 60 69 
PWK 55 81 62 48 79 
REM 11 46 13 12 41 
RLO 27 15 30 33 10 
RMH 31 65 34 19 56 
SAB 6 68 8 3 66 
SAP 21 9 21 25 13 
SBK 5 29 6 7 22 
SHF 20 10 17 24 5 
SHP 38 42 36 34 40 
SLM 18 34 20 16 36 
SNT 43 67 48 42 72 
SOL 2 11 2 5 8 
SOV 76 27 78 85 31 
SPG 44 23 44 56 24 
SPP 40 22 40 47 20 
SUR 78 71 83 80 71 
TBS 15 12 18 23 6 
TKG 9 32 10 11 30 
TMT 87 91 90 87 91 
TRU 28 5 26 35 7 
VIL 91 66 91 91 52 
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WBO 51 59 55 57 67 
WHL 25 19 32 29 17 
WSL 85 76 89 90 60 
 
Table C: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2007 - 1 July 
2008) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ABL 24 3 17 25 32 13 
ADH 90 78 16 80 77 78 
ADR 70 53 77 70 76 54 
ADW 63 22 8 71 82 30 
AEG 26 12 38 24 27 20 
AFE 41 43 68 45 49 44 
AFX 52 82 41 60 44 81 
AGL 1 48 75 1 1 58 
ALT 68 76 81 66 52 72 
AMS 7 57 90 6 4 64 
ANG 12 10 73 7 10 37 
APN 35 33 32 35 38 42 
AQP 79 91 89 73 25 91 
ARI 33 59 80 31 18 75 
ARL 48 44 78 51 59 39 
ART 67 61 43 76 78 55 
ASA 13 41 47 13 12 32 
ATN 66 79 74 72 62 82 
AVI 45 30 27 47 54 15 
BAT 71 46 62 63 69 45 
BAW 20 4 60 20 28 3 
BCF 87 81 30 87 85 79 
BEL 69 64 79 65 63 69 
BIL 2 56 61 2 2 63 
BSR 56 29 56 58 72 43 
BVT 14 25 64 17 17 19 
CLH 61 65 76 69 67 65 
CML 78 47 22 67 70 49 
CPI 81 89 84 84 68 90 
DRD 57 23 7 54 71 35 
DSY 40 55 28 41 35 53 
DTC 46 31 44 48 56 23 
ESR 72 54 19 74 79 48 
FBR 75 68 46 78 80 62 
FSR 9 34 3 9 8 24 
GFI 11 11 45 8 14 18 
GND 38 36 14 37 42 52 
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HAR 23 20 49 19 20 38 
HCI 77 84 87 61 46 87 
ILA 60 35 23 59 73 8 
ILV 55 72 52 52 48 76 
INL 31 16 37 30 34 9 
INP 19 6 31 15 23 4 
IPL 25 8 57 26 29 1 
ISA 88 63 2 88 90 57 
IVT 82 83 72 79 74 85 
JSE 49 28 71 46 53 28 
LBH 64 74 91 55 45 83 
LEW 47 9 67 44 60 5 
LON 43 88 86 40 13 89 
MDC 51 62 35 50 43 73 
MPC 42 13 26 43 57 7 
MRF 44 19 1 42 55 41 
MSM 29 2 55 27 36 11 
MST 83 71 34 85 84 47 
MTN 4 17 36 3 6 27 
MUR 18 5 50 14 21 14 
NED 17 40 58 16 15 33 
NTC 32 42 4 33 31 25 
OLG 85 86 6 89 88 74 
OMN 62 58 85 64 66 59 
PAM 74 75 88 68 58 86 
PET 76 70 12 77 75 84 
PGR 54 45 33 56 65 36 
PIK 36 51 29 38 33 50 
PNC 73 67 13 82 83 61 
PSG 65 85 42 75 61 80 
PWK 59 77 20 62 51 70 
REM 10 38 65 12 9 40 
RLO 37 39 48 36 40 26 
RMH 30 60 15 32 19 51 
SAB 6 69 63 10 3 71 
SAP 21 14 59 23 26 17 
SBK 5 26 25 5 7 22 
SHF 22 15 11 22 24 12 
SHP 34 50 39 34 30 56 
SLM 15 37 10 18 16 31 
SNT 58 80 83 57 41 77 
SOL 3 21 69 4 5 46 
SOV 80 49 70 81 86 21 
SPG 50 27 18 49 64 10 
SPP 39 32 53 39 47 34 
SUR 86 73 40 83 81 60 
TBS 16 18 66 21 22 16 
TKG 8 24 54 11 11 29 
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TMT 84 90 21 90 87 88 
TRU 28 1 24 28 39 6 
VIL 91 87 51 91 91 68 
WBO 53 66 82 53 50 67 
WHL 27 7 9 29 37 2 
WSL 89 52 5 86 89 66 
 
Table D: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2008 - 1 July 
2009) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ABL 22 9 16 17 23 13 
ADH 82 78 18 77 72 78 
ADR 66 65 84 72 75 65 
ADW 69 41 10 70 82 8 
AEG 24 3 31 19 29 4 
AFE 50 62 76 52 50 61 
AFX 51 69 49 53 47 64 
AGL 2 25 67 1 2 23 
ALT 61 79 86 61 54 79 
AMS 13 51 89 10 6 54 
ANG 7 16 75 6 8 28 
APN 29 22 39 31 27 36 
AQP 75 91 85 79 36 91 
ARI 34 43 81 29 19 47 
ARL 53 50 83 54 57 59 
ART 74 64 36 76 80 56 
ASA 8 26 42 11 10 32 
ATN 60 72 72 65 63 75 
AVI 54 34 41 43 53 30 
BAT 71 57 65 64 71 63 
BAW 33 2 47 26 40 2 
BCF 78 85 37 87 84 85 
BEL 62 63 69 66 69 35 
BIL 3 46 62 3 1 49 
BSR 59 52 58 62 73 44 
BVT 16 32 64 21 18 31 
CLH 47 60 74 58 62 62 
CML 67 68 20 69 70 74 
CPI 76 88 78 81 64 89 
DRD 49 37 7 55 66 41 
DSY 39 53 24 40 34 58 
DTC 55 40 40 50 59 37 
ESR 72 67 12 75 79 68 
FBR 64 83 63 82 74 83 
107 
 
FSR 9 30 3 9 9 26 
GFI 11 14 46 8 11 24 
GND 40 31 14 41 46 25 
HAR 15 8 50 13 16 7 
HCI 73 84 88 63 51 87 
ILA 65 56 27 68 78 43 
ILV 48 71 57 51 45 77 
INL 32 10 30 32 38 11 
INP 27 15 26 24 25 16 
IPL 28 6 54 30 39 12 
ISA 89 89 2 90 90 90 
IVT 81 77 77 73 68 76 
JSE 46 29 66 48 56 38 
LBH 68 73 91 47 32 72 
LEW 45 24 70 46 55 29 
LON 43 58 87 36 15 73 
MDC 42 70 33 49 37 70 
MPC 38 11 29 38 52 19 
MRF 52 20 1 44 60 5 
MSM 21 4 59 22 30 14 
MST 88 59 21 85 85 45 
MTN 1 17 34 2 4 20 
MUR 19 1 43 15 24 3 
NED 18 39 55 18 14 48 
NTC 31 35 6 35 35 33 
OLG 86 87 4 88 89 82 
OMN 58 49 79 56 65 51 
PAM 77 80 90 67 58 80 
PET 70 74 15 74 76 69 
PGR 85 54 38 60 67 46 
PIK 37 45 28 37 28 55 
PNC 79 75 19 84 83 66 
PSG 84 86 48 78 61 86 
PWK 56 81 32 59 49 81 
REM 12 23 52 14 13 6 
RLO 41 42 56 42 43 42 
RMH 30 47 17 34 20 52 
SAB 6 61 61 7 3 67 
SAP 36 13 45 28 31 10 
SBK 5 21 25 5 7 27 
SHF 25 18 11 27 26 21 
SHP 20 28 35 23 21 34 
SLM 17 38 9 20 17 40 
SNT 57 82 82 57 42 84 
SOL 4 27 73 4 5 22 
SOV 80 33 68 83 86 57 
SPG 63 48 13 71 77 15 
SPP 35 36 51 39 44 39 
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SUR 90 66 44 80 81 71 
TBS 14 12 71 16 22 17 
TKG 10 19 53 12 12 1 
TMT 87 90 22 89 87 88 
TRU 23 7 23 25 33 18 
VIL 91 76 60 91 91 60 
WBO 44 44 80 45 48 50 
WHL 26 5 8 33 41 9 
WSL 83 55 5 86 88 53 
 
Table E: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2009 - 1 July 
2010) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ABL 27 10 16 17 25 10 
ADH 75 73 34 75 70 73 
ADR 59 50 74 67 75 54 
ADW 87 32 3 85 86 1 
AEG 37 1 32 21 39 2 
AFE 58 59 81 50 53 58 
AFX 74 72 57 55 51 75 
AGL 2 30 60 1 2 23 
ALT 65 74 75 57 52 72 
AMS 15 56 89 9 6 56 
ANG 23 22 77 6 8 26 
APN 33 19 43 23 22 33 
AQP 77 91 79 80 31 90 
ARI 39 36 78 29 19 38 
ARL 62 47 87 52 61 46 
ART 78 64 45 79 81 63 
ASA 1 37 44 11 10 36 
ATN 76 75 72 73 64 71 
AVI 49 39 41 45 54 42 
BAT 44 58 56 65 69 62 
BAW 17 2 37 32 45 3 
BCF 80 81 52 86 83 85 
BEL 66 79 66 82 80 74 
BIL 4 55 50 3 1 51 
BSR 68 38 28 60 73 39 
BVT 21 23 62 13 14 22 
CLH 86 63 76 58 63 61 
CML 57 65 27 64 66 69 
CPI 52 90 82 70 55 89 
DRD 81 48 9 62 72 32 
DSY 14 44 21 35 32 48 
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DTC 48 33 46 49 58 29 
ESR 64 53 11 74 78 47 
FBR 61 82 70 76 68 83 
FSR 11 35 5 10 9 37 
GFI 34 17 42 8 11 19 
GND 53 27 15 43 49 18 
HAR 26 13 38 14 20 13 
HCI 60 87 90 63 48 88 
ILA 40 52 40 71 77 45 
ILV 46 68 47 48 41 65 
INL 42 11 29 31 38 9 
INP 31 20 22 30 24 20 
IPL 35 5 63 25 33 6 
ISA 89 86 4 90 90 84 
IVT 79 83 80 78 71 81 
JSE 63 29 69 46 57 34 
LBH 41 61 71 42 29 57 
LEW 43 12 65 44 56 11 
LON 32 71 85 40 16 68 
MDC 47 76 49 51 40 78 
MPC 22 16 36 39 46 24 
MRF 70 41 1 53 62 30 
MSM 28 7 64 24 30 16 
MST 83 49 19 84 85 60 
MTN 7 15 23 2 4 8 
MUR 45 4 39 28 37 4 
NED 18 42 54 15 12 43 
NTC 16 43 13 38 34 44 
OLG 85 84 6 88 89 87 
OMN 69 60 86 59 65 53 
PAM 72 77 91 66 59 79 
PET 67 57 8 72 76 64 
PGR 56 67 51 68 67 67 
PIK 29 51 30 36 27 50 
PNC 82 70 17 83 82 70 
PSG 71 85 53 69 60 82 
PWK 51 80 24 56 47 76 
REM 8 34 48 18 15 35 
RLO 10 31 61 41 44 28 
RMH 38 54 18 33 18 55 
SAB 3 69 59 7 3 66 
SAP 36 26 31 34 35 25 
SBK 5 28 26 5 7 27 
SHF 13 18 12 22 23 14 
SHP 6 9 33 12 17 21 
SLM 24 40 10 19 13 40 
SNT 73 78 88 54 43 77 
SOL 12 21 67 4 5 17 
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SOV 90 46 68 81 84 52 
SPG 55 24 2 61 74 49 
SPP 30 25 55 37 42 31 
SUR 54 66 58 77 79 80 
TBS 9 14 73 16 21 15 
TKG 25 8 25 27 28 5 
TMT 88 89 20 89 88 86 
TRU 19 6 35 20 26 12 
VIL 91 88 84 91 91 91 
WBO 50 45 83 47 50 41 
WHL 20 3 14 26 36 7 
WSL 84 62 7 87 87 59 
 
Table F: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2010 - 1 July 
2011) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ABL 20 7 15 18 26 5 
ADH 70 66 24 70 71 65 
ADR 76 69 77 75 73 67 
ADW 91 21 2 89 91 28 
AEG 31 5 35 34 40 3 
AFE 47 58 80 49 51 58 
AFX 63 81 48 63 56 79 
AGL 1 29 56 1 2 26 
ALT 57 71 73 59 58 66 
AMS 8 56 89 8 6 51 
ANG 7 23 75 7 8 16 
APN 18 19 44 20 20 25 
AQP 78 91 74 69 37 90 
ARI 27 32 82 25 18 35 
ARL 51 52 86 55 62 55 
ART 79 62 42 80 81 56 
ASA 13 44 50 12 10 43 
ATN 71 79 78 74 68 74 
AVI 43 41 36 44 50 46 
BAT 61 8 34 51 69 63 
BAW 37 3 43 29 43 2 
BCF 87 89 52 86 82 88 
BEL 84 84 65 83 79 84 
BIL 2 53 53 2 1 50 
BSR 65 59 28 73 75 59 
BVT 11 16 67 13 16 11 
CLH 56 37 79 57 66 36 
CML 54 47 20 54 61 53 
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CPI 55 83 84 56 44 82 
DRD 67 51 9 72 77 60 
DSY 36 54 26 40 30 54 
DTC 50 46 49 50 57 47 
ESR 75 42 7 77 83 48 
FBR 64 78 72 67 64 77 
FSR 9 34 5 9 9 32 
GFI 10 22 47 10 11 12 
GND 44 40 14 47 53 30 
HAR 23 11 46 15 21 7 
HCI 68 85 90 61 48 85 
ILA 77 63 51 79 80 57 
ILV 53 74 37 53 45 72 
INL 34 25 33 37 39 19 
INP 22 20 23 26 25 23 
IPL 25 4 66 21 28 6 
ISA 86 76 4 88 90 75 
IVT 72 77 85 71 67 73 
JSE 49 30 68 45 59 20 
LBH 42 60 62 42 32 61 
LEW 45 27 64 43 55 29 
LON 40 45 81 32 19 44 
MDC 52 82 41 52 36 81 
MPC 29 2 40 28 41 4 
MRF 58 50 3 60 65 34 
MSM 17 6 70 17 27 10 
MST 81 55 21 82 85 62 
MTN 3 14 29 3 4 21 
MUR 35 1 30 33 47 1 
NED 16 39 58 14 12 42 
NTC 39 35 12 39 33 39 
OLG 85 88 8 90 87 87 
OMN 69 61 87 62 63 71 
PAM 66 80 91 65 60 76 
PET 73 73 10 76 74 69 
PGR 80 70 61 68 70 70 
PIK 28 28 27 35 31 15 
PNC 74 75 18 81 78 80 
PSG 62 86 71 66 54 86 
PWK 48 57 22 48 49 49 
REM 19 38 54 24 15 38 
RLO 41 33 59 41 46 31 
RMH 30 48 19 30 17 40 
SAB 6 64 60 6 3 64 
SAP 32 13 32 31 34 9 
SBK 5 26 25 5 7 22 
SHF 21 18 11 22 23 24 
SHP 12 9 39 11 14 18 
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SLM 15 43 13 23 13 41 
SNT 59 87 88 58 42 83 
SOL 4 24 69 4 5 27 
SOV 88 68 63 85 86 78 
SPG 60 49 1 64 72 52 
SPP 33 17 57 36 38 13 
SUR 83 72 55 78 76 68 
TBS 14 15 76 16 22 17 
TKG 38 31 31 38 35 33 
TMT 89 90 17 91 88 89 
TRU 24 12 45 19 24 14 
VIL 90 67 38 84 84 91 
WBO 46 36 83 46 52 37 
WHL 26 10 16 27 29 8 
WSL 82 65 6 87 89 45 
 
Table G: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2011 - 1 July 
2012) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ABL 20 3 15 18 26 1 
ADH 72 76 26 74 70 75 
ADR 70 61 61 73 74 64 
ADW 91 44 1 88 91 39 
AEG 35 14 32 32 41 14 
AFE 50 56 80 49 49 50 
AFX 76 80 42 65 61 76 
AGL 1 17 60 1 3 11 
ALT 62 77 66 64 63 72 
AMS 14 59 91 12 7 47 
ANG 7 7 75 6 9 2 
APN 21 31 48 24 18 43 
AQP 74 69 57 61 51 49 
ARI 31 41 85 29 22 34 
ARL 49 36 79 53 64 29 
ART 79 60 37 80 83 71 
ASA 11 33 54 11 10 27 
ATN 77 84 76 79 69 79 
AVI 40 13 38 34 43 28 
BAT 46 57 22 50 48 61 
BAW 28 2 55 27 38 3 
BCF 78 74 34 84 81 73 
BEL 80 86 83 83 77 85 
BIL 3 45 58 3 1 35 
BSR 73 71 39 76 76 63 
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BVT 13 27 70 13 16 24 
CLH 59 49 82 63 68 56 
CML 51 46 21 51 56 45 
CPI 54 72 87 46 36 78 
DRD 64 25 8 60 75 25 
DSY 29 51 36 38 29 55 
DTC 53 64 53 58 55 68 
ESR 81 79 7 86 85 74 
FBR 66 82 74 70 65 82 
FSR 8 32 5 8 8 33 
GFI 10 19 51 9 11 9 
GND 47 55 16 52 54 48 
HAR 24 12 46 16 21 4 
HCI 68 88 88 66 47 88 
ILA 89 65 49 82 82 69 
ILV 60 85 41 62 46 86 
INL 37 9 24 33 44 6 
INP 26 10 23 26 28 12 
IPL 22 4 71 21 27 19 
ISA 88 87 4 90 89 83 
IVT 75 81 86 71 66 81 
JSE 45 11 67 44 60 18 
LBH 38 53 63 42 31 51 
LEW 44 22 59 43 58 13 
LON 36 16 72 28 30 10 
MDC 52 78 40 48 32 84 
MPC 25 1 52 19 33 8 
MRF 69 68 2 72 72 57 
MSM 27 47 78 31 24 44 
MST 83 58 30 81 84 53 
MTN 2 8 31 2 4 7 
MUR 41 5 25 40 52 16 
NED 19 52 64 22 12 52 
NTC 33 38 9 39 35 41 
OLG 87 90 12 89 87 89 
OMN 56 48 84 55 62 54 
PAM 58 63 89 59 59 59 
PET 71 73 11 78 78 70 
PGR 84 75 44 75 71 77 
PIK 34 40 35 41 34 37 
PNC 61 50 20 67 73 58 
PSG 63 89 65 69 50 90 
PWK 55 67 19 54 53 62 
REM 17 39 56 23 15 36 
RLO 43 43 62 45 45 46 
RMH 30 42 17 30 20 65 
SAB 5 62 69 5 2 67 
SAP 42 18 27 36 42 22 
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SBK 6 29 29 7 6 26 
SHF 18 23 13 20 19 20 
SHP 9 15 43 10 13 23 
SLM 12 35 14 17 14 40 
SNT 57 83 90 56 39 87 
SOL 4 24 73 4 5 17 
SOV 85 54 47 85 86 60 
SPG 65 30 10 57 67 32 
SPP 32 28 68 35 37 31 
SUR 82 70 50 77 80 80 
TBS 15 21 81 14 17 21 
TKG 39 20 28 37 40 5 
TMT 90 91 33 91 88 91 
TRU 23 26 45 25 23 30 
VIL 67 37 3 68 79 42 
WBO 48 34 77 47 57 38 
WHL 16 6 18 15 25 15 
WSL 86 66 6 87 90 66 
 
Table H: Liquidity Rankings per Instrument per Liquidity Measurement (2 July 2012 - 1 July 
2013) 
Alpha ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE Liquidity 
ABL 39 1 12 18 33 1 
ADH 76 68 19 72 70 73 
ADR 65 55 55 71 71 59 
ADW 88 53 1 89 91 40 
AEG 33 11 26 38 49 12 
AFE 57 60 76 52 50 74 
AFX 73 84 59 70 59 87 
AGL 7 25 50 2 3 13 
ALT 66 63 71 65 66 61 
AMS 26 57 90 23 8 43 
ANG 21 10 72 9 12 4 
APN 9 32 63 16 15 45 
AQP 69 56 13 68 69 56 
ARI 24 38 79 28 27 26 
ARL 50 27 74 59 67 23 
ART 87 78 28 83 84 66 
ASA 18 29 56 11 9 31 
ATN 86 88 80 79 75 84 
AVI 38 18 46 35 39 20 
BAT 22 70 35 47 41 78 
BAW 36 5 52 27 40 10 
BCF 80 83 33 86 82 83 
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BEL 77 90 88 81 76 90 
BIL 6 59 49 3 2 47 
BSR 81 51 37 77 78 37 
BVT 4 23 73 15 16 27 
CLH 49 71 89 67 65 71 
CML 47 36 31 44 46 54 
CPI 45 49 84 43 34 60 
DRD 70 33 9 66 74 33 
DSY 37 35 44 26 26 46 
DTC 67 52 51 53 54 52 
ESR 74 79 7 84 85 72 
FBR 58 62 78 57 58 64 
FSR 15 31 5 7 7 29 
GFI 14 4 47 10 17 2 
GND 63 64 16 55 52 70 
HAR 28 8 42 25 32 3 
HCI 46 74 86 54 47 80 
ILA 82 72 45 80 81 53 
ILV 52 81 43 60 45 81 
INL 44 15 29 37 42 18 
INP 40 42 22 30 28 35 
IPL 11 2 75 14 24 7 
ISA 90 89 4 90 90 86 
IVT 71 82 77 69 61 82 
JSE 68 24 65 50 62 32 
LBH 41 58 70 39 30 58 
LEW 51 9 54 46 60 8 
LON 55 14 41 31 38 22 
MDC 25 50 40 33 23 63 
MPC 35 3 60 22 29 6 
MRF 64 80 3 78 77 76 
MSM 42 54 81 36 25 57 
MST 83 73 39 82 83 65 
MTN 2 16 38 1 4 21 
MUR 53 13 24 42 51 15 
NED 12 48 67 21 11 44 
NTC 29 30 11 32 31 36 
OLG 85 87 14 87 86 89 
OMN 8 41 82 49 56 51 
PAM 27 61 85 62 64 67 
PET 78 45 8 75 79 50 
PGR 75 67 30 74 72 68 
PIK 54 34 32 40 36 30 
PNC 72 47 20 64 68 49 
PSG 56 85 69 63 48 85 
PWK 60 77 21 61 53 69 
REM 10 37 61 19 14 42 
RLO 23 40 64 45 43 39 
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RMH 31 65 18 29 18 55 
SAB 3 76 62 4 1 77 
SAP 43 17 27 41 44 14 
SBK 1 28 34 6 6 28 
SHF 30 19 10 24 21 17 
SHP 17 12 57 8 10 16 
SLM 16 26 15 12 13 34 
SNT 62 86 91 58 35 88 
SOL 5 22 66 5 5 25 
SOV 84 69 48 85 87 62 
SPG 61 44 23 56 63 48 
SPP 32 20 68 34 37 19 
SUR 59 66 58 73 73 75 
TBS 20 21 83 20 19 24 
TKG 13 43 17 51 57 38 
TMT 89 91 36 91 88 91 
TRU 34 7 53 17 22 11 
VIL 79 46 2 76 80 5 
WBO 48 39 87 48 55 41 
WHL 19 6 25 13 20 9 
WSL 78 75 6 88 89 79 
 
Table I:  Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2005 - 1 July 
2006) 
 
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
    
Turnover 
Ratio 
-0.0834 1.0000 
   
Daily 
Average 
Value Traded 
0.9756 -0.0872 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.9092 -0.0273 0.9419 1.0000 
 
JSE Liquidity 0.6065 -0.0652 0.6054 0.4242 1.0000 
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Table J:  Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2006 - 1 July 
2007) 
 
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average 
Market Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
    
Turnover 
Ratio 
0.6338 1.0000 
   
Daily 
Average 
Value Traded 
0.9781 0.6082 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.8978 0.3504 0.9406 1.0000 
 
JSE Liquidity 0.6554 0.9730 0.6294 0.3876 1.0000 
 
Table K:  Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2007 - 1 July 
2008) 
  
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average 
Market 
Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
     
Turnover 
Ratio 
0.6647 1.0000 
    
Average 
Spread 
-0.0398 0.2373 1.0000 
   
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
0.9872 0.6713 -0.0714 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.9165 0.4166 -0.2112 0.9338 1.0000 
 
JSE 
Liquidity 
0.5604 0.9242 0.3050 0.5520 0.2942 1.0000 
 
Table L:  Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2008 - 1 July 
2009) 
 
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average 
Market 
Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
     
Turnover Ratio 0.7541 1.0000 
    
Average 
Spread 
-0.0206 0.1895 1.0000 
   
118 
 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
0.9748 0.7712 -0.0558 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.9211 0.5789 -0.1706 0.9444 1.0000 
 
JSE Liquidity 0.6648 0.9413 0.2701 0.6800 0.4686 1.0000 
 
Table M:  Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2009 - 1 July 
2010) 
 
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
Average 
Market 
Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
     
Turnover Ratio 0.6261 1.0000 
    
Average 
Spread 
0.0532 0.2812 1.0000 
   
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
0.9060 0.7029 0.0099 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.8698 0.4975 -0.0912 0.9414 1.0000 
 
JSE Liquidity 0.5972 0.9706 0.2959 0.6885 0.4915 1.0000 
 
Table N:  Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2010 -1 July 
2011) 
 
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market 
Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
     
Turnover 
Ratio 
0.6889 1.0000 
    
Average 
Spread 
-0.0605 0.1895 1.0000 
   
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
0.9897 0.7024 -0.1086 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.9497 0.5238 -0.1695 0.9579 1.0000 
 
JSE Liquidity 0.7221 0.9511 0.1813 0.7207 0.5627 1.0000 
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Table O: Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2011 - 1 July 
2012) 
  
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market 
Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000 
     
Turnover 
Ratio 
0.7112 1.0000 
    
Average 
Spread 
-0.1546 0.0963 1.0000 
   
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
0.9873 0.7403 -0.1714 1.0000 
  
Average 
Market Cap 
0.9562 0.5530 -0.2413 0.9592 1.0000 
 
JSE Liquidity 0.7110 0.9668 0.0770 0.7429 0.5623 1.0000 
 
Table P: Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measurement Rankings (2 July 2012 - 1 July 
2013) 
  
ILLIQ 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Average 
Spread 
Daily 
Average 
Value 
Traded 
Average 
Market 
Cap 
JSE 
Liquidity 
ILLIQ 1.0000      
Turnover 
Ratio 
0.5957 1.0000     
Average 
Spread 
-0.2664 0.0262 1.0000    
Daily Average 
Value Traded 
0.9132 0.7232 -0.1984 1.0000   
Average 
Market Cap 
0.8976 0.5593 -0.2633 0.9675 1.0000  
JSE Liquidity 0.5275 0.9540 0.0890 0.6643 0.5026 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
